Israeli Security in the Context of the Peace Process

Published in Security Dialogue Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1994

The Middle East peace negotiations will bring about major changes in the military strategies, arms acquisitions, and force deployments of the states involved. The first agreement involving Israel and the Palestinians was negotiated in Oslo and signed in Washington on September 13, 1993. This agreement established a framework for the negotiation of interim autonomy for the Palestinians and redeployment of Israeli troops, beginning with the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and extending to the rest of the West Bank regions of Judea and Samaria by July 1994. Within five years, permanent arrangements for these regions are to be negotiated and implemented. If the process continues, it will lead to federation or confederation between Jordan and the Palestinians, or perhaps to a Palestinian state.

Continuing negotiations between Israel and Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon are designed to lead to additional agreements. A settlement involving Syria will involve partial or complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the strategic Golan Heights, while peace with Jordan and Lebanon will require new security arrangements on these fronts. These arrangements will be based on unilateral policies, deployments, and strategies, as well as regional confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) and multilateral arms limitations.

The effort to bring stability and security to the region will also require explicit cooperation from more distant states that have played a significant role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria and other states have sent forces to fight in previous wars against Israel, and Iran and Libya are considered to be potential bases for missile attacks involving non- conventional weapons against Israeli targets. If regional arms control efforts involve these states, Israel will be able to reduce the resources devoted to long-range strategic capabilities. On the other hand, if the radical states reject the agreements and their capability to attack Israel increases, the emphasis on strategic deterrence and defense will grow.

Redeployment and Withdrawal from the West Bank

In the 1967 war, the Israeli military captured the West Bank (the Judea and Samaria regions), which had been held by Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. (The Gaza Strip was under Egyptian control, but was populated mainly by Palestinians.) The Sinai was returned to Egypt under the terms of the 1979 Peace Treaty, which included detailed provisions for demilitarization and verification.

The first stage of the current peace process, involving redeployment and withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, is likely to have a relatively limited effect on Israeli military strategy. From the Israeli perspective, the major test of this stage will be the degree to which terrorism and guerrilla warfare are reduced. Success depends largely on the ability and interest of the PLO and the Palestinian police force in enforcing the Oslo agreement and disarming radical opposition groups and Islamic fundamentalists. However, the ability of Israel to respond to major military threats to national survival, that have formed the core of Israeli national security doctrine since 1948, is not likely to be effected.

Later stages, including withdrawal from most of the West Bank and new security arrangements with Jordan, will have much greater strategic impacts. The nature of this impact depends on two central factors: the demilitarization of areas under Palestinian control, and the degree to which the IDF maintains control over the airspace, the central mountain range, and the roads that connect the heights to Jordan and Iraq in the East, and central Israel towards the West. 1)Demilitarization

The major threat of a large-scale conventional attack on Israel continues to be from the East. In the long term, planners are concerned that a resurgent Iraq, joined by Jordan under a fundamentalist Islamic regime, Syria, and even Iran, which has begun to repair relations with Iraq and other Arab states, could launch a combined attack. Together, these states could deploy over 7,500 main battle tanks, thousands of artillery and mortar launchers, and hundreds of combat aircraft, outnumbering Israeli standing forces by as much as 4 to 1 (3 to 1 after mobilization of reserves).0 Although Israeli technological superiority can offset this quantitative disadvantage, a full-scale conventional attack could still overwhelm Israeli forces, causing very high casualties, and threatening the survival of the state.

At the narrow points outside Tel Aviv, pre-1967 Israel is only 15 kilometers wide, and defense of these borders is impossible.1 In the absence of any strategic depth, a full- scale attack across any border could easily reach major cities in a few hours. Thus, demilitarization was and continues to be the sine qua non for withdrawal.

The demilitarization of the Sinai was an essential to the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, and provided Israel with the assurance that this area would not be used to mass troops for a surprise attack. However, while the Sinai provides an unpopulated buffer zone 200 kilometers wide, such a large demilitarized area cannot be created in the West Bank. Demilitarization of a Palestinian state is important, but in the face of a threat from massive ground forces, Israel will also rely on offensive air power to destroy large-scale tank and artillery concentrations before they can reach the Jordan River (see discussion below).

Demilitarization of the West Bank is also essential to prevent interference with Israeli responses to the threat of a major attack. Anti-aircraft systems in this territory, within a few kilometers of air bases and mobilization centers, could significantly hamper Israeli Air Force operations. Small units from Palestinian ground forces could also make it difficult to move tanks and artillery from Israel through the mountain passes and major roads and to the Jordan River.

Enforcement and verification of demilitarization will pose significant problems. If Israel relinquishes control of the borders and ports in Gaza, and in the absence of specific verification provisions and their implementation, Palestinians will be able to obtain large numbers of small hand-held SAMs, as well as anti-tank weapons, land mines and small weapons. 2)Control over airspace, ridges, and major roads

As Israeli ground forces withdraw from the West Bank, the capabilities of the Air Force will increase, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In his trip to Washington in November 1993, Prime Minister Rabin negotiated an agreement to purchased 20 to 24 F-15E aircraft, at a cost of $1.8 billion. These aircraft will extend the long-range capabilities of the IAF, enhancing Israel's ability to attack offensive air and ground formations before they cross the Jordan River. Emphasis on ground attack helicopters such as the Apache, for use against tank and artillery columns, will also grow. To insure that the IAF maintains freedom of action over the West Bank, the Israeli government may seek to maintain control over the airspace in this region.

The airspace over the West Bank is also important for training and surveillance. Without overflight rights, the Israeli Air Force will be unable to fly from West to East for more than two minutes without overflying the border between Israel and the area under Palestinian control.

In addition, control of the mountain range running from North to South in the West Bank will continue to be important to Israeli national security. This range dominates the coastal plain where most of the Israeli population and civilian infrastructure is located (between Haifa and Tel Aviv). This range also looks down on the Jordan Valley and river, providing early warning as well as defensive lines against invasion.2

As noted above, in order to meet and interdict any attack from the East, Israeli forces will have to engage these forces before they reach the mountains in the West Bank. From these largely uninhabited high-points, the IDF can maintain an early warning and long-range intelligence capability. Early detection of large scale troop movements in Jordan, and, more importantly, from Iraq and Syria, can provide Israel with the time to mobilize its ground forces and launch preemptive air attacks.

By controlling these high points, the IDF will also insure that ground forces can go from bases in Israel to the Jordan Valley without interference, to interdict attacking ground forces before they reach Israeli territory. Continued Israeli military control of these areas, as well as the East- West roads and passes that lead to the Jordan Valley, are therefore considered important for national defense.

Withdrawal from most of the West Bank will also have significant indirect effects on the Israeli military, resulting from the loss of land for bases, weapons storage and forward mobilization centers, and land for holding large- scale training exercises. Israel is a very small state, with little space for additional military facilities. The IDF will be hard pressed to relocate these bases within the pre-1967 borders, and preliminary estimates suggest that this aspect alone will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Over the past decade, following the peace treaty with Egypt, Israel absorbed the bases that were located in the Sinai. Unless Israel is able to maintain some of its bases on the West Bank, withdrawal will force the IDF to reduce the number of bases and the scope of exercises. Until the implications of these changes are understood and alternatives are developed, Israel is likely to proceed slowly and cautiously through this process.

Syria and the Golan Heights

Following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, Syria became the major military threat to Israel, and the focus of security planning. Syria's President Assad declared his objective of achieving strategic parity with Israel, independent of Egypt, and embarked on a major effort to acquire and deploy new weapons.3 The Israeli attack during the 1982 Lebanon war was designed, in part, to blunt this effort, but the Soviet Union replaced the weapons lost in the war, and Syrian capabilities continued to grow. Syrian ground forces have increased rapidly over the past two years, and include 4800 main battle tanks (1400 of which were acquired in the past two years). The Syrian standing army is twice as large as Israel's, and a surprise attack, based on forces in place, and supported by combat aircraft and SSMs with chemical warheads, could prevent mobilization of Israeli reserves. Three-quarters of the Israeli ground forces are in the reserves,4 and unhampered mobilization takes from 48 to 96 hours.

Syria also acquired SS-21 and, more recently, long- range ballistic missiles and chemical warheads. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, this buildup is continuing, and the alliance between Iran and Syria has been strengthened. Some analysts argue that Syria has achieved strategic parity, leading a prominent former general to declare that Israel has "lost the monopoly of strategic deterrence" that allowed the IDF to control the pace of escalation and bring past wars to an end on favorable terms.5 (This analysis discounts the Israeli nuclear deterrent, reflecting the general perception that this capability is reserved for use as a "weapon of last resort", where the survival of the state is threatened. In the case of limited wars, or "piecemeal" conquest of Israeli territory, the nuclear threat does not play a credible role, as demonstrated clearly in the case of the combined Syrian and Egyptian attacks in 1973. See the detailed discussion below.)

Israeli planners are primarily concerned about a Syrian attack on Golan Heights. The Golan is Israel's primary line of defense in the North, controlling the region below and providing strategic depth. Damascus is only 60 kilometers from the Israeli front lines, and the implicit threat to the Syrian capital is seen as a major factor in the stable and cautious nature of the Assad regime's policies since 1973.6

From this perspective, Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, without offsetting measures, could lead to instability and renewed military challenges from Damascus. In addition, the Golan contains important sources of water for Israel, Syria, and Jordan, and overlooks Tiberias Lake, which is Israel's main fresh water reservoir. Clashes over control of these sources contributed to the outbreak of the 1967 war.

In this area, as in the West Bank and Sinai, demilitarization is important to Israeli security. However, the Golan is only 40 kilometers wide, and can be crossed quickly. Thus, a demilitarized zone in this area alone is insufficient to protect Israel against a large scale attack. A major Syrian ground attack staged from just outside the demilitarized Golan Heights would be able to reach Israeli territory in a few hours, and with almost no time for the mobilization of reserves, leaving Israel at a major disadvantage.

As a result, additional security arrangements involving the stationing of external forces on the Golan as a barrier to a Syrian attack are being considered. One to two combat- ready divisions of American or American-led forces (including artillery, combat aircraft, anti-aircraft, etc.) provide one option. However, given the questions of long- term commitment and credibility of foreign commitments, Israel may not be willing to stake its security on such a force.

Alternatively, major reductions in the deployment of standing Syrian forces in proximity to the Golan have been proposed. A significant cut in Syrian ground forces near the border would reduce the threat of surprise attack. The Assad regime would be able to maintain two divisions in the Damascus area for internal security, with some armor, but would not require thousands of T-72 tanks for this purpose.

Israel is also likely to insist that the early warning and intelligence facilities on the Golan and Mt. Hermon at the northern end of this region be retained or replaced by equivalent capabilities. In the agreement with Egypt, the multilateral forces led by the United States have continued to operate the facilities in the Sinai for both states. Israel has also sought to develop reconnaissance satellites and other high-altitude platforms, and these might provide an alternative to the existing electronic early warning stations.

For Israel, withdrawal from the Golan is linked directly to a clear end to the conflict with Syria, marked by a formal peace treaty, the establishment extensive economic cooperation, open borders, tourism, and "normalization". A number of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) have been proposed to create the foundation for these relationships, including crisis management mechanisms, frequent meetings between military commanders, pre-notification and observation of military exercises, and other CSBMs based on the CSCE system. This model has been successful in the case of Egypt, and the peace has been preserved for over 15 years, despite the assassination of Sadat and periodic tensions. Similar measures with respect to Syria will balance the costs of withdrawal from the Golan and reduce Israel's threat perception and the dangers of escalatory crises and war with Syria.

The Long Range Strategic Threat

The major and fastest growing strategic threat to Israel comes from the long-range missiles and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that are being acquired or sought by a number of countries in the region. During the six weeks of the 1991 Gulf War, the Israeli economy was essentially paralyzed by the Iraqi threat to use Scud missiles with chemical warheads against Israeli cities. Iraq was also close to reaching a nuclear weapons capability, and there is considerable evidence that Saddam also had an advanced program to develop biological weapons.

The proliferation of missiles and non-conventional weapons in the Middle East is continuing. Libya, Syria, and Iran have significant stockpiles of chemical weapons, and all three have or are acquiring long-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets in Israel. (Iran and Syria have recently deployed North Korean No Dong missiles, with ranges of over 1000 kilometers, and are reported to be acquiring production facilities for this missile.)7 If international sanctions are lifted, Iraq will seek to recover these capabilities immediately.

In the long term, the efforts of Iraq and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons pose the greatest threats to Israel and to the region. (Libya has also sought an assembled weapon or fissile material ready for assembly, and Algeria has purchased a reactor from China which can be used to produce plutonium.)8 Under the Islamic regime, Iran actively opposes the peace process and supports fundamentalist guerrillas operating out of Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

Since the end of the 1991 Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq, the perceived threat from Iran has increased. Shortly after he was elected Prime Minister in 1992, Yitzchak Rabin declared that Iran was a potentially greater threat than Iraq in the medium and long-term. "We estimate that Iran now has the appropriate manpower and resources to acquire nuclear weapons in the next 10 years. It will happen unless there is an appropriate international effort to prevent Iran from achieving its ends."9

Regional stability and Israeli security depend on removing the threat posed by these states and their unconventional weapons. However, here the impact of the peace process is weakest. Iran, Iraq, and Libya have refused to participate in the negotiations and have denounced the Arab states and Palestinians who have agreed to recognize and deal with Israel.

Unless Iran, Iraq, and Libya are brought into the negotiations, or their nuclear programs are halted, the strategic competition in the region will accelerate. Israeli leaders have said that they expect the international community, led by the United States, to block these threats before weapons are produced, but the Iraqi precedent does not provide confidence that much will be done. The IAEA safeguard regime has been strengthened in the wake of the Iraqi case, intelligence capabilities have been increased, and intrusive special inspections have been authorized. The burden of proof has been shifted so that NPT signatories are expected to provide "assurance that no undeclared materials or clandestine facilities or activities exist".10 However, Israel remains skeptical regarding the technical ability and political will of the international community to enforce these requirements, and the vacillation in the case of North Korea has reinforced this skepticism. Even if the peace process is fully successful with respect to the Palestinians, Syria, and Jordan, the growth of long-range strategic threats will lead Israel to place even greater emphasis on strategic deterrence, early warning, and pre- emptive capabilities.

The Relationship With the United States

For the past twenty years, the United States has provided Israel with critical political and economic support, as well as advanced weapons and technology. This relationship was formalized in a series of agreements, the creation of the joint political-military working group (JPMG), which meets twice a year, and other high-level contacts. In 1979, American aid offset the costs and risks in the peace agreement with Egypt and the withdrawal from the Sinai. To balance the large numbers of advanced weapons being sold to the Arabs, successive American administrations have pledged to maintain Israel's qualitative superiority, although there is significant debate regarding the implementation of these pledges.11

IDF Chief of Staff General Ehud Barak has explicitly cited the special relationship with the U.S. as one of the three pillars of Israeli security in the context of the peace process.12 The readiness of Israel to take security risks depends, in part, on the status of relations with Washington. As noted above, an agreement with Syria involving the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Golan Heights may involve American commitments to deploy combat troops and to provide or operation early warning stations. However, in the event of conflict and tensions with the United States, Israeli leaders can be expected to act with greater caution with respect to troop redeployment and withdrawal in the Golan and West Bank.

Ballistcic Missile Defense

Historically, Israeli policy with respect to the threat of large-scale attack has been based on a combination of preemption and the threat of massive retaliation.13 However, as a result of both political and military limitations, as illustrated in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1991 Gulf War, preemption has become politically more difficult and militarily uncertain. As a result, and in response to the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and unconventional weapons in the region, Israel is considering the deployment of ballistic missile defense as means of blunting a first strike.

In the past, defensive systems have generally been of secondary importance, and the IDF has not invested significant resources in dedicated defensive weapons and technology, such as static, ground-based air defense. However, in the wake of the Iraqi Scud missile attacks in 1991, and the growing threat from Iran and Syria, there is evidence that Israel is now prepared to absorb a first strike from chemical weapons, to be followed by a massive retaliatory attack.14

The focus of these defensive efforts is the Arrow anti- tactical ballistic missile, which is designed to intercept incoming warheads at a range of 40 to 60 kilometers, with particular emphasis on the ability to destroy chemical warheads.15 Research and development for this system is being financed in large part by the US government, and estimates of the cost of full deployment range from $2 to over $6 billion.

The Arrow, however, has many critics, particularly within the IDF leadership. The military has not allocated its own funds for strategic defense, and former Air Force Commander Bin-Nun has called for reducing the resources devoted to this project, and using the available funds to strengthen and diversify offensive and retaliatory forces.16 Even if the lower budget estimates prove correct, the cost of each Arrow will remain significantly greater than the low- cost Scud B or Scud C missiles or their derivatives deployed in the Arab states and Iran. Detection, tracking, discrimination, and other technical requirements remain formidable, particularly given the very short distances and flight times involved.

At the same time, the availability of ballistic missile defense (BMD) could provide Israeli decision-makers with greater flexibility in the context of a limited peace process. If, in addition to Egypt, peace agreements are signed and implemented with Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the North African Arab states, and sanctions prevent Iraq from rebuilding its forces, the major strategic threat to Israel will come from Iran. (This assumes that the peace agreements include arms limitations -- see discussion below.) In this case, a limited BMD capability designed largely to block missile attacks from Iran could extend Israeli security and contribute significantly to regional stability. Arms Control and Regional Security

Israeli leaders, in both the government and the military, have always been wary of arms limitations in the Middle East. Previous efforts, such as Tripartite Agreement of the 1950s, international prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons, and the NPT/IAEA regime in Iraq, are seen as failures.17 However, in a major change in policy, Israel became an active participant in the multilateral working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS) that was created during the 1991 Madrid conference. Other regional participants include Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Iran, Iraq, and Libya are not involved, while the Syrian government has made participation in the multilateral talks, including the ACRS, contingent on a bilateral agreement on the Golan Heights.

These talks have led Israel to consider the possibility that in the context of regional peace agreements, arms limitations can contribute to national security. Israeli policy emphasizes confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), limits on chemical and biological weapons, missiles, and conventional weapons. Israel signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and restraints involving the Israeli nuclear capability are being considered, although these are seen as the last and distant stage in the process.18

After decades of intense ethnic and religious violence and hatred, regional CSBMs, involving a number of states, are seen as critical first steps necessary "to build and nurture mutual confidence" and "to diminish the levels of suspicion, hostility and conflagration".19 For Israel, a high degree of cooperation, and direct, frequent and visible contact with Arab military forces is critical to the peace process. Specific proposals, based to some degree on the experience gained in the context of the CSCE, include measures to prevent surprise attacks, pre-notification agreements regarding large-scale military maneuvers, hot- lines and regular communications between military commanders, and a center to coordinate naval activities and respond to incidents in the Red Sea.

With respect to concrete measures to limit arms, Israel is primarily interested in controlling the acquisition and deployment of conventional weapons including tanks, combat aircraft, artillery, etc. If Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia agree to reduce the number of such platforms in their military forces, the conventional threat will be reduced significantly. To date, the Arab states have refused to discuss such arms limitation arrangements.

At the same time, the Arabs, as well as many extra- regional actors, have pressured Israel to accept limits on its nuclear capability. For Israel, the strategic deterrent is an essential guarantee of national survival, and is viewed as necessary until peace agreements have been implemented, tested, and the existential threat has been dismantled. Policy makers reject calls for Israel to sign the NPT or open the Dimona nuclear complex for inspection prior to the establishment of a durable peace, and the end to threats to national survival. They fear that if Israel gives up this option, the Arab states would turn to war again.20 Thus, arms control in the region must link agreements on conventional as well as non-conventional weapons.21

Such measures will also require the development of a credible verification system. As demonstrated in the case of Iraq, the existing nuclear regime is unable to insure "timely warning" of a nuclear weapons program. Although some improvements in the safeguard system have been announced, Israel has insisted on the development of a regional verification system, which can function independently of the political and technical limitations of the IAEA structure.22

Instead of the existing NPT regime, the Israeli government policy calls for the creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Such a framework would be negotiated directly between all the states in a regional forum, and verification would be conducted through mutual inspection, rather than the IAEA or other international organizations. Although Egypt has proposed a regional agreement to ban all weapons of mass destruction, the Egyptian position is based on extension of the existing IAEA safeguard system, which is unacceptable to Israel.

Thus, arms control and CSBMs could provide an important addition to security in the context of regional peace agreements. From the Israeli perspective, this process must include CSBMs and conventional weapons limitations. If the Arabs continue to press exclusively for Israeli concessions on the nuclear issue, the prospects for progress in this area are small. Summary

The peace process will result in significant changes in Israeli strategy and policies, but the specific nature of these changes depends directly on the details of the agreements. Withdrawals and redeployments on the West Bank and Golan Heights will lead to increased emphasis on early warning and offensive air capabilities. In the long term, demilitarization of these areas, as well as arms limitation agreements to reduce Arab offensive capabilities, both conventional and non-conventional, can allow Israel to reduce the resources allocated to defence. However, given the political instability in the Middle East, unless Iran and Iraq are brought into this process, Israel will be forced to maintain its long-range strategic deterrent.

From the perspective of Israeli security policies and perspectives, the ongoing negotiations provide both opportunities and potential risks. This process will be judged a success to the degree that it leads to a direct and tangible reduction in the military threat. However, there is also significant concern that this threat will continue and could even increase as a result of the withdrawal of military forces from the West Bank and Golan Heights, and from pressures to relinquish the nuclear deterrent option. Thus, from a military and security perspective, the negotiations are viewed cautiously.


0- Based on data from the Middle East Military Balance 1992-3, (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1993) pp.440-1 According to this data, a combined Arab ground force including Syria, Jordan, Palestinian forces, and partial participation from Iraq and Saudi Arabia would outnumber the standing Israeli army by 4 to 1 in personnel, 2 to 1 in tanks, and 3 to 1 in guns and mortars. When all forces are fully mobilized, the personnel ratio can be reduced to 3 to 1, or less, depending on the size of the commitment of Iraqi forces. See also The Military Balance 1993-4 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), p.225.

1- Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), (Appendix IV: Israel's Strategic Geography)

2- Ibid.

3- Michael Eisenstadt, "Arming for Peace? Syria's Elusive Quest for 'Strategic Parity", Policy Paper No. 31, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992)

4- The Middle East Military Balance: 1992-1993, p.438

5- General Yisrael Tal, cited by Arye Shalev Shalom V'Bitachon B'Golan (Peace and Security in the Golan), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1993)

6- Dov Tamari, "The Syrian-Israeli Balance of Forces and Strategic Parity", in The Middle East Military Balance: 1989-90, edited by Joseph Alpher, Westview Press, Boulder, 1990

7- Ha'aretz, 9 April 1993 citing an article published in the New York Times

8- Initially, this project was not reported to the IAEA, in violation of NPT requirements, and it was only placed under safeguards after the construction had been detected by reconnaissance satellites. The reactor is reported to be 15 MW, with an upgrade potential to 40 MW.

9- Jerusalem Post, January 21 1993

10- Lawrence Scheinman, "Nuclear Safeguards and Non- Proliferation in a Changing World Order", Security Dialogue Vol. 23, Number 4, December 1992, pp. 42

11- Dore Gold, "US Policy Toward Israel's Qualitative Edge" Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Report No. 36, (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1992).

12- Aluf Ben, Ha'aretz, 4 March 1993, p.1b

13- Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 1988

14- Steve Rodan, "Target Ready", Jerusalem Post Magazine, 6 October 6 1993, p.6-10

15- Marvin Feuerwerger, The Arrow Next Time? Israel's Missile Defense Program for the 1990s, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC 1991.

16- Ha'aretz, 26 September 1993

17- Michael B. Oren, "The Tripartite System and Arms Control in the Middle East: 1950-1956", in Arms Control in the Middle East, Dore Gold, editor, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990)

18- Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993 (Jerusalem: Foreign Ministry)

19- ibid.

20- Shalheveth Freier, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and its Ambience", unpublished manuscript 1992.

21- Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1992); and Alan Platt, editor, Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1992)

22- See Gerald Steinberg, "International/Regional Verification Options in Nuclear Arms Control" in Arms Control in the Middle East, Dore Gold, editor, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Westview Press, 1990