

**The Centrality of Confidence Building
Measures:
Lessons from the Middle East**

Gerald M. Steinberg
Director, Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
steing@mail.biu.ac.il

Published in

***CONFLICT PREVENTION: FROM RHETORIC TO
REALITY (Vol. 2)***

Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment, editors
(Lexington Books, 2004)

**Based on the conference FROM RHETORIC TO POLICY:
TOWARDS WORKABLE CONFLICT PREVENTION AT
THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVEL organized by:
The United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan
and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs,
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada**

Chapter 12

The Centrality of Confidence Building Measures: Lessons from the Middle East

Gerald M. Steinberg

In regions that have been characterized by protracted ethno-national and religious strife and violence, the strengthening of conflict prevention mechanisms and the transition from zero-sum to cooperative positive sum relationships, are strongly dependent on the development of confidence building measures (CBMs). The creation of confidence between the parties is a necessary condition for conflict transformation, and for prevention of renewed hostility.

The role of CBMs is recognized in the literature on conflict prevention, particularly by Lund, Kreisberg, and Zartman. In his comprehensive volume on *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Michael Lund cites the 1994 US Government policy statement on a *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, which explicitly includes CBMs such as military-to-military contacts between adversaries, and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East, as central dimensions of the American policy of preventive diplomacy.¹ Kreisberg, in turn, analyzes the role of measures designed to promote reconciliation and inter-communal accommodation, and while he does not discuss CBMs specifically, this concept is quite similar to the types of actions that he considers.² However, as will be discussed in detail below, the analysis of the application of CBMs in such processes is quite sparse, and the objective of this paper is to remedy this deficiency.

In this chapter, we first examine the theoretical foundation of confidence building measures in the context of negotiations and transitional processes in conflict prevention. The role of CBMs in the phases of conflict prevention, post-conflict negotiation, and post-agreement implementation are considered. Examples of the successful use of CBMs will be described and analyzed, such as the CSCE

experience, as well as in other regions. The importance of spill-over from individual CBMs, leading to a change in the overall climate and atmosphere of relations, is considered in these contexts.

As will be demonstrated, the legacy of violence, war, and terrorism leaves deep fissures and high levels of distrust, and CBMs provide the means for overcoming the tendency to revert back to the old patterns. In the absence of a network of CBMs, other steps towards conflict prevention and resolution, involving significant security risks to the parties, such as peace treaties and arms control, are unrealistic.

On the basis of this theoretical foundation, the role of CBMs in the Middle East peace process, are examined, with emphasis on the successful impact of particularly salient CBMs such as Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem.³ The explicit inclusion of CBMs in the treaties and agreements related to the Middle East peace process are also considered in this discussion.

In this context, specific CBMs, both at the level of elites and civil society, are considered. These include track-two meetings and joint projects involving political leaders, journalists, educators, academics, military officers, religious figures, and businesspersons, as well as people-to-people dialogues at the community level. Cooperative economic and environmental projects, and natural disaster planning programs are also discussed.

In addition, missed opportunities and the issue areas in which the absence of CBMs interfered with the process of conflict prevention and resolution will be identified and analyzed. Lessons are drawn from this experience, with specific recommendations including (1) Developing a code of conduct; (2) Acknowledging how little the parties know about each other; and (3) Involving civil society and promoting people to people dialogues.

The Basis for Confidence Building in Conflict Prevention and Resolution

In the transition from protracted conflict to stability, cooperation based on shared interests is generally a long and gradual process. Surveying the research on conflict prevention, Michael Lund notes that "theory in conflict resolution suggests ... that mediations and other third-party conflict interventions are likely to be more effective when many of the conditions of advanced conflicts are absent: the issues are fewer and less complex; conflicting parties are not highly mobilized, polarized and

armed; .. and the parties are not so committed that compromise involves massive loss of face.”⁴ As Lund also noted, these conditions are also important for successful preventive diplomacy, which applies “not only to situations that have seen no recent conflict but also to postconflict situations where violence or coercion have been largely terminated but the efforts of postconflict peacebuilding are apparently insufficient to move the conflict into stable peace and away from the danger of re-escalation.”⁵

In order to create such an environment, to develop the conditions for what Zartman and others define as “conflict transformation,”⁶ and to preserve cooperation in the face of crises, setbacks, and renewed violence, confidence-building measures (CBMs) play an essential role. Without the creation of confidence between the parties, and among the societies, as well as a common language and set of symbols, movement towards conflict resolution is not sustainable. The zero-sum perceptions, as well as the legacies of violence, war, and terrorism leave deep fissures and high levels of distrust, and CBMs (or in some cases, tolerance building measures) are necessary to overcome the tendency to revert back to the old patterns.⁷ CBMs are a vital stage, and without such measures other more complex steps, involving significant risks to the parties, such as arms control, become virtually impossible. In his programmatic report, *An Agenda for Peace*, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted the importance of actions to limit the spread of violent conflicts, even after they have escalated. In this context, CBMs such as hot lines are important aspects of preventive diplomacy.⁸

Similarly, when peoples have been separated for many years by conflicts of interest and by emotions and hatred, and when they have highly distorted views of each other, dialogues are vital to prevent renewed violence and begin the process of conflict resolution. Lund notes the importance of modifying perceptions and feelings of mistrust and suspicion among the parties. “Misunderstandings and distrust among the disputing parties might be addressed through low-profile, track two diplomacy.”⁹ Such dialogues can take many forms – academic conferences, workshops and joint research projects, meetings between journalists, political exchanges, military-to-military meetings, discussions of threat perceptions or analysis of “White Papers” (an exercise used in the Asia-Pacific Regional Forum). The involvement of elite decision-makers and political or military leaders, as well as opinion leaders who help formulate public opinion (teachers, journalists, religious leaders, etc.), is necessary in creating an environment of

tolerance and ending hatred and incitement, which, in turn, contributes to extremism and terror.

At the same time, it is important to create a wide base for confidence building through broad involvement in dialogue, primarily through people-to-people activities. Public opinion, even in non-democratic countries, plays a major role in both maintaining conflict and also creating support for peace.¹⁰ If dialogue is limited to a small elite, it is possible, and in many cases, likely that the hostility that continues among the masses (“the street”) will continue unabated, fed by myths, negative stereotypes and ignorance. Thus, extensive interaction and cooperative exchanges involving neighborhood groups, religious communities, students, professional guilds (doctors, lawyers, teachers, or even taxi-drivers) are vital.

CBMs can also take the form of functionalist cooperation in politically less sensitive areas, such as economic and environment projects, as well as planning for joint responses to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, and even prolonged drought. Cooperation in these activities can create a basis for mutual tolerance and, eventually, shared perceptions and recognition of common interests. As Carment and James note, preventive diplomacy “entails identifying the conditions necessary for the successful resolution of ethnic conflicts by focusing on issue areas that are of common interest to the adversaries.”¹¹ Such activities are central for the process of conflict amelioration and eventual resolution, in ethno-national as well as other conflicts.

CBMs played a useful role in the transition that took place in Europe between 1974 and 1990. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began in Helsinki in the early 1970s, and was followed by the Stockholm and Vienna agreements. These agreements included a wide range of CBMs and CSBMs (confidence and security-building measures),¹² including facilities for crisis communication and early warning in preventing inter-ethnic conflict.

For three decades prior to the Helsinki conference, the foundations of military strategy and national security remained relatively constant in both global and regional terms. The Cold War divided the world in half, between the West and East, with smaller states receiving weapons, training, economic assistance, and other forms of backing from their respective superpower patron. In the transition that culminated in the early 1990s with the peaceful resolution of the Cold War, the development of mutual confidence across the divide was essential.

While security aspects of the transition were central, the human dimension and the need to involve civil society in the CBM process was

and remains significant. “Basket three” issues include the principles of openness, freedom of movement, democracy and the rule of law, human rights or freedom of ideas, etc. In this framework, the cultural dimensions, including the respect for different religions and traditions, and the need to protect the rights of minorities, are key factors.¹³

In other regions, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific, conflict prevention and amelioration also depend on developments in civil society, and on extensive implementation of CBMs. Indeed, reference to the need for CBMs are included in all of the treaties and agreements related to the Middle East peace process. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty emphasizes the role of such measures, as does the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, and the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty. In all the agreements and joint declarations that have been issued since the 1993 DOP (the “Oslo Agreement”), the importance of CBMs were reiterated.

In addition, a number of frameworks were created to provide venues and mechanisms, particularly for regional activities to build confidence. These include the five multilateral working groups established at the Madrid conference in 1991, European Union’s Euro-Med Partnership program (also known as the Barcelona project), the OSCE’s Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, and a similar program initiated by NATO. However, in practice, the implementation of CBMs was very slow, and proved to be a serious impediment to the peace process, as will be discussed in greater detail below.

Confidence Building in Models of Conflict Prevention and Amelioration

From a strict realist (or neo-realist) perspective of international relations, in which national policies are based on interests, factors such as confidence, and thus confidence-building would seem to be irrelevant.¹⁴ Indeed, while CBMs do not generally alter vital national interests, and therefore, in themselves, will not prevent conflict when these interests clash, they can help to facilitate agreement when the parties seek to end or prevent a conflict. Thus, even from a realist perspective, CBMs can correct misperceptions, break down barriers to communication and facilitate the realization of shared interests. In international relations, these processes are vital in preventing unwanted and accidental conflict, and helping to lead participants in a conflict to a satisfactory resolution. The CBM-based approach is linked to models of

conflict prevention and resolution based on structural prevention and attitudinal change.¹⁵

In order to examine the contribution of CBMs, it is useful to divide the general process of conflict prevention or resolution (if the prevention efforts fail) into three phases – pre-negotiation, formal negotiation, and post-agreement implementation – and to analyze the role of CBMs in each phase.

Conflict prevention and the transition from unmitigated conflict to some form of accommodation can be triggered by war weariness,¹⁶ outside pressures, fundamental societal changes, internal political dynamics,¹⁷ and other factors. However, even following a major and costly military confrontation, there is usually strong opposition to a basic change in direction (unless the outcome is catastrophic and leads to total surrender and military occupation, as in the case of Germany and Japan in 1945).

Thus, in the environment of a long and protracted struggle, conflict prevention and radical shifts towards peace that are based on rapid transitions in a single step are unlikely to succeed. The first phase of negotiations is often tentative, and faces opposition from a variety of forces with ideological or other interests in maintaining the status quo. The general proclivity for a “tit for tat” strategy must be broken, and the first steps in this process are often the most difficult.¹⁸ Questions regarding the sincerity of the other side, as well as the ability of leaders to sustain a peace process in the face of domestic opposition, are central.

Pre-negotiation activities (getting to the table or “negotiations about negotiations”) as well as preventive diplomacy are designed to mitigate the hostility and smooth the way towards direct negotiations and formal agreements. Techniques including efforts to define and narrow the sources of conflict and the national interests, discussions focusing on new approaches to achieve those interests, measures designed to de-escalate the violence and the rhetoric used to justify it, development of communication channels, and steps towards mutual commitments to replace confrontation with negotiation.¹⁹

When formal negotiations begin, the intensity of the contacts between the parties increases. Once the former enemies are “at the table,” the stakes, including costs of failure for the respective leaders, also grow significantly. At this stage, factors such as good faith, mutuality, and commitment to implementing agreements are critical to success, while failure in any of these dimensions can lead to an end of the process and return to violence and confrontation. At the same time, however, the negotiators also need to demonstrate resoluteness to their

own constituencies, to insure that they will obtain the best agreement possible, in terms of national interests. This contradiction that is the essence of bargaining processes makes successful negotiations particularly difficult.²⁰

After agreements are reached, they must be implemented. This process was relatively successful in the cases of the regime change in South Africa²¹ and the transition in Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War, but in other cases, this phase is also often tentative and uncertain. Disagreements over definitions, interpretations, and sequences can trigger crises, which, unless defused, will re-ignite the cycle of violence. For example, in the Middle East, Palestinian terrorism in 1996, three years after the Oslo agreement, led to a deep crisis in this peace process, and basic changes in Israeli political attitudes, as reflected in the election of the Netanyahu government.²² Similarly, in July 2000, the effort to negotiate the “permanent status agreement” stipulated in the Oslo process ended in failure, followed by a campaign of violence that reversed all of the previous gains. Similarly, in the case of Northern Ireland, the dispute over implementation of agreements regarding decommissioning of IRA weapons in January 2000 led to a major crisis²³ that was only resolved with major difficulty. While the factors leading to success in some cases, and failure in others, are complex, and are linked to the basis of the conflict, the deep-seated ethno-national nature of the conflict is likely to be a central factor leading to renewal of a conflict.

As noted, in each of these phases, the development of confidence-building measures is essential in the creation of the political and psychological foundations for the transition from conflict to cooperation. Nations, ethnic groups, and members of different religions with a history of hostility and violence between them cannot resolve or manage the conflict without some form of mutual understanding and communication. Before any party will agree to take risks, make concessions, and relinquish assets (tangible, such as land, or intangible, such as recognition of legitimacy) in the hope that this will lead to a quid pro quo from the other parties, some basis for reciprocal risk-taking must be established.²⁴

In the pre-negotiation phase, when the level of mutual suspicion is highest, the actors often have no direct or reliable channels of communication. In order to deescalate, they must signal their intentions in a clear and non-threatening manner. In this context, Osgood proposed a process known as Graduated Reduction in Tension (GRIT), consisting of unilateral actions (CBMs) by each side, designed, either implicitly or explicitly, to lead to a response in kind from the other side.²⁵ In the

absence of any positive contacts, friendly sports matches (“ping-pong diplomacy” in the case of U.S.-China relations, and wrestling teams in the case of Iran and the US) and cultural exchanges can help to alter the atmosphere, allowing initial contacts to begin, and raising the prospect of a “non-zero-sum” relationship.²⁶ In such a framework, the mutual benefits of cooperation can be realized, despite the existence of conflicting interests. In contrast, in a strictly zero-sum framework, one party’s concessions are seen as a benefit for the other side, and the reverse.

The use of CBMs can also help to alter deeply ingrained hostile images that make changes in perceptions very difficult. Cognitive dissonance reinforces these images,²⁷ even when efforts are made to alter the negative impressions. However, in the extraordinary cases when conciliatory actions by leaders of the opposing side are unexpected and inconsistent with negative images and perceptions, they can lead to fundamental changes in public opinion. Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, and his message of “no more war, no more bloodshed” is a central example of such a CBM, as will be discussed in detail below.

Similarly, CBMs can contribute to conflict prevention and dialogue in ethno-national conflict relationships characterized by zero-sum perceptions regarding “historical justice.” When the parties have mutually exclusive views of the past and of responsibility for events, as in the Arab-Israeli conflict, unilateral CBMs can broaden understanding of the perceptions of the other.²⁸ This process can lead to the realization that insistence on particularistic definitions of historical justice will lead to continued conflict. Such a realization, in turn, promotes a change in emphasis from the settling of old scores to the development of pragmatic and forward-looking relationships.

During the formal negotiation phase, mutual CBMs can help the parties in making difficult concessions involving significant risks. (Although, by definition, activities that involve significant security or political risks go beyond the concept of confidence building measures. However, the definition of what constitutes a significant risk is subject to debate.)²⁹ While intensive and substantive negotiations are taking place, gestures and words that do not directly impinge upon the substance of the talks, but indicate a sense of common fate and shared humanity, are important in creating an atmosphere of cooperation and transition from war to peace. In this phase, the emphasis on unilateral actions and processes based on a “graduated reduction in tensions” (GRIT) is replaced by mutual and more formalized CBMs, such as crisis

communications systems (“hot lines”) and exchanges of journalists, academics, and other public figures. In 1963, during the talks between the U.S. and the USSR following the Cuban Missile Crisis, such measures contributed to the agreement on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the evolution of detente. Similarly, during the period between 1969 and 1972, when the U.S. and Soviet governments were negotiating the SALT I and ABM treaties, a series of cultural and other exchange agreements helped to ease the transition and reduce internal opposition. CBMs also provide a safety-net which keeps negotiations going during crises, when the wisdom of continued discussions is questioned on one of both sides to a dispute.

In successful examples of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict negotiations, after agreements are reached, confidence-building measures are still important in providing assurances with respect to implementation. Visible preparations for implementation, prior to deadlines, are important examples of the type of CBMs that can be undertaken in this context. In addition, cooperative verification and monitoring of agreements are also important CBMs.³⁰ In the CFE/OSCE context, the Open Skies Treaty provides an important example³¹. The informal US-Soviet agreement in 1991 to withdraw thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from forward deployments, based on parallel unilateral statements (in contrast to formal negotiated treaties with detailed verification provisions), is also considered by some to be an example of a prominent CBM.³²

Spillover: The Essential Factor

The development and implementation of CBMs at any or all of the phases in the context of preventive diplomacy does not automatically lead to successful and long-lasting conflict resolution. In order to be successful, CBMs must spill over into other areas, and create a climate of mutuality in which a security community can be formed and maintained. The proof of success of dialogues, conferences, people-to-people activities, joint economic and environmental cooperation and projects is the substantive reduction in tensions and conflict, and the transition to non-zero sum relations. A multiplicity of such channels does not automatically guarantee spillover to conflict resolution, and there are many cases of apparent cooperative relations, which reverted to intense conflict. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is a particularly tragic

example, and the India-Pakistan CBMs involving nuclear facilities also had no wider impact.

When conflict is compounded by misperceptions and ignorance, either on the part of all the parties, or when one party and population harbors myths about and demonizes the other, spillover from CBMs results in changing images and perceptions of interests. In this process, as the parties learn more about each other's history, customs and values, and strip away the misconceptions and negative stereotypes, they are able to reduce the level of antagonism between them. However, when spillover from CBMs is minimal or does not take place, the myths and sources of conflict remain intact, and even if interests change, the conflicts are likely to continue.

CBMs in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process

The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the most intense and protracted ethno-national disputes in the world.³³ The conflict has a multiplicity of causes, including a deep-seated territorial dispute, different cultural and religious perspectives, economic disparities, and the added impact of colonialism and superpower intervention. For many years, there were no direct channels of communication, as the Arab states refused to recognize or hold direct talks with representatives of the State of Israel. In 1967, following a war in which they lost territory on all fronts, the leaders of the Arab states met in Khartoum and reiterated the policies of "no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace treaties" with Israel.³⁴

During this period, the Israeli side focused exclusively on the Arab states and their leaders, to the exclusion of the Palestinian issue. Israeli leaders refused to hold direct talks with leaders of the PLO, whom they regarded as terrorists. After 1949, Israeli leaders also rejected indirect mediation efforts, shuttle diplomacy, and proximity talks with leaders of Arab states, insisting on direct face-to-face talks, embodying mutual recognition of legitimacy.³⁵

However, in the past decade, a number of factors altered the environment. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union were key developments in this process. At the same time, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the willingness to use them, as illustrated in the case of Iraq, highlighted the vulnerability of individual states and the potential impact of instability. More immediate causes of change include war weariness, beginning with Egypt and Israel following the 1973 war, and later, extending to the Palestinians following

the stalemate of the *intifada* that began in 1988.³⁶ In combination, these factors contributed to the formal initiation of negotiations, first with Egypt, resulting in the 1979 Peace Treaty, followed, after a long delay, by the Madrid conference in 1991, the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles (the Oslo agreement), and the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty.

In each of these cases, confidence-building measures played an important role with respect to the successes. At the same time, the absence or weakness of CBMs during the implementation stages following the initial agreements, and the absence of spillover, are closely associated with the fragility of the process and its collapse in September 2000. The intensive efforts at preventive diplomacy, led primarily by the Clinton Administration, and embodied in the Camp David summit of July 2001–2000 as well as in subsequent mediation efforts, were insufficient to prevent the outbreak of violence, as will be demonstrated in detail below.

CBMs in the Egyptian-Israeli Process

From 1948 through the 1960s, relations between Israel and Egypt were very hostile, with a series of wars and continuous military tension. There were no diplomatic relations, no formalized direct channels of communication, and both sides viewed the other as a major military threat. Although a number of efforts had been made to promote an Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement through shuttle diplomacy, most notably in 1971-2, no sustained bilateral interaction took place. In this environment, actions and policies on both sides that might have been considered as CBMs in the context of a political process designed to prevent conflict, did not have any spillover effect.³⁷

The change in this relationship finally began with direct talks held at the end of the 1973 war. The fighting was halted with Israeli troops within striking distance of Cairo, while Egyptian forces were trapped in the Sinai in an area that had been previously held by Israel, and both sides were exhausted.³⁸ In contrast to previous Arab-Israeli wars, this situation was not conducive to the simple and essentially automatic demarcation of a clear cease-fire line. Under the auspices of U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger, high-level Egyptian and Israeli officers began negotiations in the Sinai desert, at the kilometer 101 marker along the Cairo-Suez road.

These talks continued for six weeks, and created the foundations for the first of two formal disengagement agreements reached in 1974 and 1975.³⁹ These agreements, and the various verification mechanisms that were created, constituted CBMs.⁴⁰ However, contacts remained limited, and little progress was made in overcoming the opposition from domestic ideological forces and political interests to further contacts, as will be demonstrated below.

Nevertheless, when viewed as the first step in the context of pre-negotiation, this limited interaction between Israel and Egypt started a process of redefining national interests, in terms of the transition from zero-sum to non-zero sum perspectives, and led to a de-escalation of violence.⁴¹ In retrospect, this interaction indeed fulfills the definition of pre-negotiation as a transitional phase in which “one or more of the parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this intention.”⁴² The talks and agreements, while very limited, helped to dissolve the “tit for tat” framework, and pushed the leaders away from an emphasis on the settling of old scores.

The contrast with the situation with respect to Syria, which had also participated in the 1973 war, was glaring. The Syrian leaders continued to reject any direct talks with Israel, and limited cease-fire negotiations, as well as prisoner exchanges and related issues, to shuttle-diplomacy via Henry Kissinger. This process was characterized by what can be described as “anti-confidence building,” or “confidence destroying measures.”⁴³ At the end of Kissinger’s intense shuttling between Damascus and Jerusalem, the Syrians refused to attend the signing ceremony in Geneva, and the Syrian signature was affixed by an officer that had been included within the Egyptian delegation. This incident highlighted the difference between the evolving Israeli-Egyptian relationship and the static Israeli-Syrian one.

During the following months, the direct contacts between Israeli and Egyptian officials intensified, and in 1977, following the election of a new government in Israel, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met secretly with Dr. Hassan Tuhami, a special representative sent by Egyptian President Sadat. These meetings were not publicized, and had no impact on public attitudes. Indeed, this activity was not accompanied by ongoing confidence building measures, and at the societal level, the hostility and “filters” through which Egyptians and Israelis viewed each other did not change significantly. However, these limited direct contacts created enough confidence at the elite level to proceed further with the negotiation process.⁴⁴

Based on the substantive discussions between Tuhami and Dayan, the leaders of both states (Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat) concluded that there was enough commonality of interest to proceed with more intensive negotiations. Most importantly, these meetings led to President Sadat's breakthrough decision to visit Jerusalem in November 1977.

This visit remains the quintessential example of a confidence building measure, and illustrates the importance of CBMs in the transition from war to peace. After three decades of warfare, which exhausted both Egypt and Israel, Sadat recognized the need for a dramatic gesture to break the deadlock and transform myths and misconceptions.

Sadat's visit, and the Israeli response were vivid examples of the impact of a major CBM during the pre-negotiation phase. Until the day of Sadat's arrival, Egypt was seen as an implacable enemy, which would use all available resources to destroy Israel. This image was the result of the numerous wars, as well as the hostile rhetoric from the Nasser era. Israelis and Egyptians had very different images and perceptions of the causes of these wars, and of the 1967 war in particular.⁴⁵ For Israelis, the 1973 war was a very bitter experience with unprecedented casualties.

In such conditions, even when one or both sides act in ways designed to alter these negative perceptions, the psychological tendency towards reinforcing existing perceptions (cognitive dissonance) contributes to misperception. For example, at first, many Israelis, including the IDF Chief of Staff, feared that Sadat's announcement that he was coming to Jerusalem was a cover for some sort of military attack.

The sudden reversal embodied in Sadat's bold move produced a rapid and fundamental change in Israeli public opinion and perceptions. Every moment of the visit was covered by the Israeli media, and the streets along route of the motorcade were lined with thousands of people with Egyptian flags. At this stage, Israelis suspended their previous conceptions, and realized that Egypt was prepared to end the state of war and establish diplomatic relations. Normalization, in the form of direct state-to-state relations at the highest level, was already taking place.

In this atmosphere, as the negotiations eventually became bogged down, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Begin was pressured to make substantial and difficult concessions in order to prevent a return to conditions of hostility and war.⁴⁶ Without Sadat's dramatic move and his conciliatory words to the Knesset and before other audiences, difficult Israeli concessions would have taken much longer to achieve. Sadat's positions were considered to be uncompromising, including the full return of the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty and the dismantling of all

Israeli settlements and bases, but his emphasis on non-violent resolution of conflicts and the change in tone were also important aspects of confidence building that had a fundamental input on Israeli society at all levels.

As noted above, CBMs are also important in the post-agreement phase of a peace process. In the Sinai, the cooperative monitoring activities of the Multinational Force and Observers⁴⁷ (MFO) is a continuous source of mutual confidence regarding the implementation of the demilitarization aspects of the Treaty.⁴⁸ Other CBMs helped to reinforce the new environment immediately after the 1979 Peace Treaty was signed. The Israeli public moved quickly to experience the new situation and normalization for themselves. Borders were opened, regular air and bus service began, and hundreds of thousands of Israelis visited Egypt, contributing significantly to this branch of the economy. Israeli tourism continued in the face of terrorist attacks, despite the overall reduction in tourism to Egypt from other countries.

However, the absence of Egyptian reciprocity has had a negative impact on Israeli perceptions, and contributed to the continued tension in the relationship. Contrary to Israeli expectations, and the explicit language of the Peace Treaty, this agreement did not trigger a fundamental change in attitudes and in relations via CBMs. The relationship between Israel and Egypt has been characterized by a “Cold Peace,” and in some instances, a “Cold War.” Although President Mubarak took office in 1981, following the assassination of President Sadat, he has avoided visiting Israel (with the singular exception of the funeral of Yitzchak Rabin in 1995, after intense American pressure), despite the frequent visits of Israeli leaders to Egypt. In addition, 20 years after the treaty was signed, Egyptian professional groups, including journalists, academics, and lawyers, maintain a boycott of Israel, ostracizing and penalizing people who visit and work on cooperative projects.⁴⁹

In addition, the Egyptian press, both official and opposition, maintains a very hostile view of Israel, highlighting accusations against Israelis (ranging from charges of responsibility for AIDS and placing aphrodisiacs in candies, to conspiracy theories involving the crash of Egypt Air 900).⁵⁰ Israel is still portrayed as an enemy, and differences over policies with respect to Lebanon, in terms of negotiations with the Palestinians, and the Israeli nuclear policy, are also subject to hostile rhetoric.

These trends became apparent immediately after the signing of the Treaty, were reinforced by the Lebanese War in 1982 (when Egypt

withdrew its ambassador from Israel), continued even after the Gulf War and Madrid Conference in 1991, (which ended Egypt's isolation in the Arab world), the election of the Rabin government in 1992, and the Oslo Agreement in 1993. Even during the most productive phases of the peace process, Egypt actively opposed normalization between other Arab states and Israel, and this trend was reinforced again during the Netanyahu period (1996-1999).⁵¹ In the absence of significant direct contact between Israelis and Egyptians, the negative images are strengthened.

From the Israeli perspective, Egypt is seen as having played a particularly negative role in the multilateral negotiations that began following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. These multilateral working groups focused on aspects of regional importance that crossed national borders and required cooperation among a number of states. Five such groups were created – on economic cooperation, environment, water, refugees, and arms control and regional security (ACRS). The meetings and activities in these working groups were designed as regional CBMs to improve relations between Israel and the states outside the bilateral negotiation framework (such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the other Gulf States, and North Africa). However, in practice, in 1994, the Egyptian campaign to force Israel to alter its ambiguous nuclear deterrent policy brought the ACRS talks to a halt, followed by a freeze in the activities of the steering committee and the other multilateral working groups.⁵²

The absence of CBMs and dialogues with Egyptians influenced the Israeli perception of negotiations and relations with other partners, including the Palestinians and Syria. The “Cold Peace” which prevails with respect to Egypt is seen as a dangerous precedent for future agreements, and as a result, Israeli leaders seek more direct interaction and symbols of broad acceptance than was the case in negotiations with Egypt.⁵³

CBMs in the Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian Negotiations

CBMs also played a central role in the negotiations leading to the formal signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994, as well as during the period of implementation that followed. The process differed in many respects from the Egyptian-Israeli case. In the decades prior to the opening of formal negotiations, Israeli and Jordanian leaders had developed a network of informal contacts and cooperative links, and

these links and CBMs can be seen as having constituted the pre-negotiation phase in this case.⁵⁴

The informal and indirect cooperation that took place between the 1940s and the mid-1990s can be analyzed in terms of CBMs and GRIT-type processes. Israel's "open borders" policy following the 1967 war, that allowed continued Jordanian-Palestinian trade and travel across the Jordan River, and the security cooperation during this period created a high level of mutual confidence among elites.⁵⁵ Once the necessary political conditions had been created, particularly following the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (the "Oslo agreement") in 1993, the conclusion of the peace treaty was relatively straightforward.

During this period, CBMs that were visible to the general public helped to demonstrate the changes in the relationship beyond the elite level. Examples included mutual visits across the border by top political leaders, including King Hussein, Crown Prince Hassan, and Prime Minister Rabin. At first these were formally secret, but the fact that they were taking place was publicized and helped to convince the Israeli public of the commitment of Jordan to the process, and the reverse. Such visits gradually became more public and routine. Dramatic flyovers of King Hussein's plane, and public exchanges between the King in the cockpit and Israeli officials (Prime Minister Rabin and President Weizmann) were also symbols that penetrated to all levels of society.

In the implementation phase that followed the signing of the Treaty, the role of CBMs in the Israeli-Jordanian case has been significantly more positive than the Israeli-Egyptian case. The open borders and frequent interaction between Israelis and Jordanians at various levels helps to provide a basis for dialogue and a cooperative approach to joint problem solving. Jordanian workers cross into Israel daily, and Israeli textile firms have moved some operations into Jordan, providing employment.

At the same time, there are still a number of areas in which the interests and perspectives of the countries differ. There are strong differences with respect to the Palestinian issue, and Jordanians note Israeli non-tariff barriers have prevented Jordan from reaching its export potential.⁵⁶ However, the extensive network of ties between the two societies, at both the elite and people-to-people levels, provide mechanisms for peaceful exchanges and resolution of the differences. In particular, Israelis are also aware of the opposition of segments of Jordanian society to the peace process, and of the influence of rejectionist forces in the Arab and Islamic world on some Jordanians, but

these can be put into perspective as a result of the continuing close interactions.

Most importantly, the King's condolence visit in March 1997, after the murder of 7 Israeli girls by a Jordanian soldier, was a very important CBM from an Israeli perspective. This gesture of sympathy and common humanity helped to cement the transition in relations with Jordan.

Nevertheless, as in the case of Egypt, rejection of the "King's peace" and of normalization of links with Israel is used by some dissident groups in Jordan to express opposition to the government and its policies. This criticism is often couched in terms of Arab solidarity, particularly during periods of Israeli-Syrian (or Lebanese) tension, and support for the Palestinians. In November 1999, three journalists who visited Israel were disciplined by the Jordanian Press Association.⁵⁷ In Israel, these events were seen as a warning sign regarding the future of relations with Jordan, and the need for continuing CBMs.

In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution process, confidence-building activities also played a key role. Prior to 1992, as a result of the years of violence and hatred, the PLO was classified as a terrorist organization, and most contacts between Israelis and the PLO were illegal. (In the early 1970s, Prime Minister Golda Meir declared that the Palestinians did not constitute a defined people, but were simply part of the general Arab nation.) However, at critical junctures, Israel initiated unilateral CBMs, similar to the GRIT model outlined by Osgood. In 1992, following the election of the Rabin government, the restrictions on contacts with the PLO were lifted, and in September 1993, as part of the Oslo agreement, Israel and the PLO exchanged official letters of recognition. This was an important Israeli CBM. Other measures include acceptance of symbols of Palestinian sovereignty (stamps, passports, telephone exchange and international airport) even though the question of Palestinian statehood had not been resolved. Beyond the symbolic issues, Israel agreed to release prisoners (although not as extensive as demanded by the Palestinians), and opened a "safe passage" transportation corridor through Israeli territory connecting areas under Palestinian control.

Although the relationship improved significantly after the DOP (Oslo agreement) was signed in 1993, the interaction between the societies remained limited. Efforts to develop cooperative frameworks at the level of civil society to deal with shared problems, including water, the environment, etc., and also joint economic activities are often hindered by political obstacles. Palestinian officials argued that CBMs could only be implemented after a permanent status agreement is reached

to end the conflict, but the compromises necessary on both sides were made more difficult in the absence of confidence.

Furthermore, the continued use of the rhetoric of hostility and incitement undermined the efforts to create a network of community-based links that are necessary to overcome the decades of violence and hostility. In November 1999, Suha Arafat (wife of the Palestinian leader) delivered a major speech in the presence of Hillary Clinton in which she accused Israel of poisoning Palestinian water supplies and of using chemical weapons, causing cancer among the population.⁵⁸ To Israelis, this speech recalled the “blood libels” and other anti-Semitic charges that have been used to incite mass attacks against Jews for centuries, and drew a stiff protest from the Israeli government. This and similar incitement by Palestinian leaders worked against building confidence with Israel, and reduced public support for concessions and risk-taking in negotiations. In this environment, people-to-people interactions and a wide network of cooperation are necessary to create confidence,⁵⁹ but the Palestinian Authority required that all such interaction receive official approval, and during difficult periods during the negotiations, particularly between 1996 and 1999, the PA prohibited most such dialogue activities. This environment provided the background for the breakdown in the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts following the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000, followed by the beginning of a period of intense violence and terrorism that took many lives.⁶⁰

In the efforts to extend the peace process to include agreements with Syria and Lebanon, the involvement of civil society and a network of CBMs are also vital. Here, the level of interaction has been minimal, compared to the situation with respect to Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. Track-two meetings involving Israelis and Syrians (or Lebanese, who are subject to Syrian control), have been very limited, and such discussions tend to illustrate the misperceptions and distortions. To overcome intense domestic opposition on all sides, a sudden breakthrough agreement would require a strong foundation of CBMs and cooperative interactions at the level of civil society.

Finally, at the regional level, as noted above, the five multilateral working groups that were created at the 1991 Madrid peace conference failed to provide the broader forms of confidence necessary to support the bilateral negotiations. Between 1992 and 1994, extensive regional interactions did take place in this framework, with formal plenary meetings, intersessional activities, and track-two discussions in many different areas. These activities were, in themselves, important CBMs, providing an opportunity for extending the range of diplomatic and

economic links to include all of the Middle East, from North Africa to the Gulf.⁶¹ The suspension of these working groups and the CBMs they provided, beginning in 1994/5, was very costly to the peace process, and also impeded progress at the bilateral level. Resumption of regional cooperation in economic activity, environment, and water would constitute important CBMs.

Lessons and Recommendations

Spillover – The Missing Ingredient

The history of preventive diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli environment illustrates the close links between CBMs and the difficulties in overcoming protracted conflict. While CBMs that penetrated to different levels of society helped to catalyze important breakthroughs, the absence of sustained measures at the people-to-people level, particularly with respect to Egyptian-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli relations during the post-agreement implementation phases, have slowed and, at times, interrupted the process.

Most importantly, in terms of the “missing ingredients” in Middle Eastern conflict prevention efforts, the absence of spill-over from major CBM activities stands out. Each of the key developments, beginning with the 1974 separation-of-forces agreement and verification measures, followed by Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp David agreement of 1978, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, were largely isolated events, in terms of CBMs. Without extensive follow-up at the people-to-people level, deeply held suspicions remained. Spillover and the involvement of civil society through people-to-people interactions would help to overcome these shortcomings.

Towards a Code of Conduct

In any interaction between nations and ethno-national groups at the intra-state level in which there is a history of conflict and tension, it is inevitable that differences will continue to exist, whether at the pre-conflict stage, or during a period of conflict management and reduction. In some cases, particularly with respect to protracted conflicts, these differences will be quite substantive and concern core issues. In such cases, a code of conduct is necessary to prevent disagreements from

escalating into full-fledged conflict again. Such codes can and should also have a human dimension, including the prohibition of terrorism and proscribing threats and incitement that encourage or justify violence. As such, they would provide important visible CBMs.

The impact of a code of conduct can be illustrated in comparison to the conflict prevention process within individual states. Here, the operation of civil society depends on the development of mechanisms to allow competing groups and conflicting interests to continue to interact without the use of violence. Key mechanisms include legal systems with widespread legitimacy, and sanctions against intimidation and threats of violence. When these mechanisms and sanctions break down, civil society no longer functions.

In the interaction between states, there have been efforts to develop such mechanisms through the United Nations, a universal Code of Human Rights, and in other frameworks. In this context, Lund notes “global ideological conflict has been replaced by wider and deeper agreement around certain normative principles through which states and political groups are increasingly expected to pursue solutions to their political disputes.”⁶²

However, in most cases, these have clearly been inadequate, as the violence, terrorism, and other basic human rights abuses have continued in the course of renewed conflicts, without regard to the existing norms and codes. The conflict in the Balkans included fundamental violations of such codes, and contributed to the decision by NATO and the United Nations to intervene militarily.

In the Middle East, the peace process presents a framework for developing a code of conduct. Such a code would demonstrate a commitment to the peace process and provide mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes, while prohibiting incitement and rhetoric that encourages violence. As a result, it would contribute significantly to the chances of a successful transformation from conflict to mutual acceptance and cooperation.

Involving Civil Society and Promoting People to People Dialogues

As noted above, in establishing a foundation for conflict prevention, it is important to create a wide base for confidence building through broad involvement in dialogue, primarily through “people-to-people” activities.⁶³ Public opinion, even in non-democratic countries, plays a major role in both maintaining conflict and also creating support for

negotiation and compromise. If dialogue is limited to a small elite, the hostility among the masses (“the street”) will continue, fed by myths, negative stereotypes and ignorance, and encouraged by domestic political processes. In contrast, extensive interaction and exchanges among different groups is vital. Such activities create “spill-over” which influence the political process, creating or strengthening the domestic support for developing cooperation between conflicting groups.

Capacity building through training programs can create the foundations for CBM activities in each of these areas, as well as increasing the sensitivity of officials, educators and journalists with respect to issues that increase perceptions of hostility in conflict situations. (While Herbert Kelman’s “problem-solving workshops” provide an example of this type of interaction, these have been small in number and limited to small circles of relatively elite participants.)⁶⁴ In this context, declaratory and symbolic CBMs in official speeches, the media, and textbooks continue to be important. Statements that contribute to mutual fears, and increase the level of suspicion, are counterproductive. (For example, the increasing use of the Holocaust analogy by the Arab parties, and Holocaust denial in official media, is particularly damaging in terms of Israeli perceptions of Arab intentions.)⁶⁵ As Lund has noted, through workshops focusing on texts and specific issues, third parties and mediators, including NGOs and international organizations, can also contribute by explaining the sensitivities and the perceptual contexts of the parties.⁶⁶ In the Arab-Israeli context, potential additional CBMs include coordination of regional responses to natural disasters, including earthquakes, cooperation in water desalination and conservation, and in environmental issues.

Finally, it is also important to recognize the limits of CBMs. As some analysts have noted, such measures are not cost-free, and can be counterproductive in the absence of political will to pursue an end to confrontation and promote conflict prevention. “CBMs are only as strong as the fundamental political will for compromise... Without pre-existing *detente*, CBMs appear to be of little value. They cannot create *detente* and under certain circumstances, they can be *detente* consuming.”⁶⁷ This appears to be the case in situations in which the only conflict prevention activities are low-level CBMs, or are designed to create a positive impression vis-a-vis a third party or mediator, such as the US or UN, rather than to change attitudes and perceptions among adversaries. This was often the case in the Middle East, as noted above. In general, CBMs provide a basis for conflict prevention and resolution when they are

understood as the means to specific ends, rather than objectives in themselves.

At the same time, the broader links between CBMs are the other dimensions and activities related to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, and the detailed nature of the spillover discussed above, require further research. The Arab-Israeli cases provide a basis for demonstrating the importance of CBMs, as well as the consequences of the failure of the parties to invest in such measures, as illustrated in this analysis. In particular, the view that CBMs should be a *consequence* of peace making, rather than a *pre-requisite* for them, was seen to be particularly damaging to the process. While this tentative conclusion needs to be tested in additional examples of conflict prevention and resolution efforts involving protracted ethno-national disputes, the future success of Arab-Israeli efforts appears to require a much greater emphasis on developing and implementing CBMs, particularly at the level of civil society.

Notes

1. Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 6 (fn. 10).

2. Louis Kriesberg, *The Role Of Reconciliation In Changing Inter-Communal Accommodations*, Paper Presented at the International Peace Research Association Meeting, Tampere, Finland, 5-9 August, 2000.

3. In examining the role of CBMs in the Middle East and elsewhere, there is no evidence for distinguishing between interstate conflict management and prevention, and the case of conflict between a state and non-state actor, such as the Palestinians. In the case of South Africa, the example of the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission does not seem to be dependent on the intrastate nature of the conflict. However, this issue requires more detailed and systematic examination.

4. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 15.

5. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 41.

6. I. William Zartman, "Preventive Diplomacy: Setting the Stage," in *Negotiating to Prevent Escalation and Violence*, ed. I. William Zartman (Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflicts), forthcoming
<<http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/zart/zartfr.htm>>.

7. CBMs are the means of moving from the natural tendency for both sides to choose the defection strategy in a prisoner's dilemma situation, in the language of game theory.

8. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/277 - S/24111 (New York: United Nations, 17 June 1992), cited by Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*,

36

9. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 45.

10. Harold Saunders, *A Public Peace Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

11. David Carment and Patrick James, "Ethnic Conflict at the International Level: An appraisal of Theories and Evidence," in *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, eds. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 261. See also Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 44.

12. The 1990 Vienna Agreement commits the members of the OSCE to the exchange of various forms of "military information" including the numbers of major weapons platforms (tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, etc.), and annual calendars of "notifiable military activity," including information on planned exercises. The regulations governing on-site inspections and the assistance provided to, and activity of the observers, are delineated in detail. The OSCE also operates a conflict prevention center in Vienna, which is responsible for "early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management," and a database and communications network. *OSCE Handbook*, 12, *Annual Report 1996 On OSCE Activities* (Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-Operation In Europe, The Secretary General, 15 January 1997).

13. James Macintosh, "Confidence Building Measures in Europe: 1975 to the Present," in *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, ed. Richard Dean Burns (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1993); See also Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 159.

14. Analysts of ethnic conflicts have criticized the (neo)realist approach, for ignoring ethnic factors in analysis of international relations. See, for example, John F. Stack Jr., "The Ethnic Challenge to International Relations Theory," in *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, eds. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 22. However, this narrow definition of realism is based on analyses of homogeneous Western European states and the superpower relationship during the Cold War. Realists focusing on regional conflicts have included the impact of ethnic factors on state behavior in the analytic framework of interstate conflict.

15. David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, "Conflict Prevention: Naked Emperor, Path to Peace, Grand Illusion, or Just Difficult?" Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 14-18 March 2000; see also Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 41.

16. A strongcase for war weariness as the key in explaining the beginning of the Israeli-Egyptian transition following the 1973 is made by Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1993).

17. Changes in Israeli society and politics, as evidenced in the 1992 elections, which brought Yitzchak Rabin and the Labor Party to power, were major factors in the process leading to the 1993 Oslo Agreement. See David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).

18. Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

19. Fen Osler Hampson, *Multilateral Negotiations - Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 25; *Getting to the Table*, Janice Stein, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press); Harold Saunders, "We need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Prenegotiation Phases," *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1985).

20. Robert Putman, "Diplomacy and domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization*, 42 (3) (Summer 1988).

21. See Brian Frost, *Struggling to Forgive* (London: HarperCollins, 1998).

22. Gerald Steinberg, "Peace, Security and Terror in the 1996 Elections," *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Autumn 1997) (Special Issue: Israel at the Polls 1996).

23. For an analysis of the issues in the Northern Ireland negotiations, see Christine Bell and Kathleen Cavanaugh, "'Constructive Ambiguity' or Internal Self-Determination? Self-determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement," *Fordham International Law Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (April 1999).

24. The concept of CBMs is often overstretched to include many other activities, including arms control, territorial withdrawal, and instruments for preventing war. This broad definition distorts and dilutes the concept. See Marie France Desjardins, *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures: Obstacles to agreement and the risks of overselling the process*, Adelphi Paper 307, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4.

25. Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War and Surrender* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1962). For a case study of the successful application of this technique in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, see Gerald Steinberg, *Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

26. See also Table 2-2 (technique for pre-conflict peace building), in Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 47.

27. Irving L. Janis, and Leon Mann, *Decision making* (New York : Free Press, 1977).

28. As Kriesberg notes, "recognition of past injuries and continuing repercussions does not resolve matters; indeed, it is often the basis for claiming reparations or restitution. Seeking such compensation may then become matters of contention and sources of change in the accommodation that had been reached." Louis Kriesberg, *The Role Of Reconciliation In Changing Inter-Communal Accommodations*, Paper Presented at the International Peace Research Association Meeting, Tampere, Finland, 5-9 August, 2000.

29. Marie-France Desjardins, *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures: Obstacles to agreement and the risks of overselling the process*, Adelphi Paper 307, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4.

30. Arian L. Pregonzer, *Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures: Suggestions for Northeast Asia* (New Mexico: Verification and Monitoring Analysis Department, Sandia National Laboratories, 1994).

31. Anne M. Florini, "The Open Skies Negotiations," in *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament* ed. Richard Dean Burns (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1993), 119.

32. Nikolai Sokov, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 21, (December 1997).

33. When compared to other forms of international conflicts, a number of distinct factors characterize ethno-national disputes, including the triggers for violence, the role of violence in crisis management, external involvement, values at stake, and outcomes. See Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "The Ethnic Dimension of International Crises," in *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, eds. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).

34. Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967* (Indianapolis : Pegasus, 1969).

35. In 1949, proximity talks with Egypt held under the auspices of the United Nations, and the subsequent armistice agreement did not lead to direct negotiations for a permanent peace treaty, as had been expected and stipulated. This experience led to the Israeli decision to eschew such indirect negotiations in the future.

36. David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996).

37. For a list of such potential CBMs, see Yair Evron, *Conflict and Security Building Measures in the Israel-Arab Conflict* (Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, University of Tel Aviv, 1995), 105-108.

38. Michael N Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

39. Sadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers* (Princeton University Press, 1992), 244.

40. Brian S. Mandell, "The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management," *Department of External Affairs, Arms Control Verification Studies*, No. 3 (1987); Itshak Lederman, *The Arab-Israeli Experience in Verification and Its Relevance to Conventional Arms Control in Europe*, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland, Occasional Paper no. 2 (1989); Michael G. Vannoni, *Sensors in the Sinai: A precedent for regional Cooperative Monitoring* (Albuquerque: Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, 1996).

41. This analysis differs from that of Janice Stein, who claims to discern two periods of pre-negotiation. The first began in January 1977, with the election of Jimmy Carter and ended with the direct negotiations initiated by Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. When these talks reached an impasse, a second period of pre-negotiation began in January 1978 and ended with the convening of the Camp David talks in August 1978. Janice Gross Stein, "Pre-negotiation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Paradoxes of Success and Failure," in *Getting to the Table*, ed. Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

42. I. William Zartman, "Pre-negotiation: Phases and Functions," in Stein, "Pre-negotiation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 4.

43. See the description in Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 249-259; Moti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*; William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986).

44. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981).

45. Israelis viewed the war as the result of continued Egyptian hostility, triggered by the eviction of UN peace-keepers from Sinai, the mobilization of Egyptian troops along the borders, a naval blockade in the Red Sea, and Nasser's threats of violence. In the commonly held Egyptian view, the war was the result of Israeli territorial expansion and aggression.

46. William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1986); Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981).

47. The term MFO is itself the result of a compromise, encompassing the Israeli proposal for a military force to enforce the terms of the agreement, and the Egyptian proposal based on observers.

48. At an earlier stage, after the disengagement agreements following the 1973 war, the monitoring activities also provided important CBMs. Vannoni, *Sensors in the Sinai*.

49. For an Egyptian view, which reinforces Israeli concerns and suspicions, see Emad Gad, "The Egyptian Israeli Relations; from Cold Peace to Cold War," *The International Political Journal*, (Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya, Al Ahram, Cairo) Issue 138 (October 1999).

50. Parliament Member, Amin Hamed, from President Mubarak's National Democratic Party, claimed that "the Israeli 'Mossad' infiltrated the American control tower and shifted the airplane from its course so it would be hit [by a missile]." Another member of Parliament, Omar Barakat declared that "There was an American-Zionist conspiracy. I blame the CIA and the Mossad [...]." cited in "Egyptian Reactions to the EgyptAir Crash Investigation," Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI) Dispatch 62, 6 December 1999, citing Al-Ahram (Egypt), 23 November, 1999.

51. Daniel Sobelman, "Denunciations of Israel meant for internal use only," *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv) (26 March, 2000), citing Amin al-Mohodi *Al-Hayat*, London.

52. Gerald M. Steinberg, "The 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," *NonProliferation Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall 1996); Joel Peters, *Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).

53. Gerald M. Steinberg, "Peace, Security and Terror in the 1996 Elections," *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Autumn 1997) (Special Issue: Israel at the Polls 1996).

54. In William Zartman's view, "prenegotiation is not just a definitional construct, but a preparatory phase without which the negotiation would not have taken place." ("Prenegotiation: Phases and Function." *International Journal* 44, 2, (1989): 243) Using Zartman's model, the prenegotiation in this case was conducted through various types of de-facto coordination and cooperation, which smoothed the path to a formal agreement. I am grateful to Amira Schiff for bringing this to my attention.

55. Aharon Kleiman, *Du-Kiyum L'lo Shalom* (Coexistence without Peace) (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1986).

56. Summary of presentation by Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi, "Peace in the Middle East and the Jordanian Economy," in *Peacewatch*, 227, Washington Institute for Near East Policy (October 1999).

57. Rami Khouri, "Political gangsterism," *The Daily Star*, Beirut, 28 October, 1999.

58. Tamar Hausman and Ben Lynfield, "Suha Arafat: Israel polluting our water," *Jerusalem Post*, 12 November 1999, 1.

59. Ben Mollov, "Intercultural Dialogue and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Theory, Practice and Conclusions," presentation before the annual meeting of the Israel Political Science Association, Jerusalem, 4 June, 1998.

60. The violence that began in September 2000 had multiple causes, and the detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.

61. Joel Peters, *Building Bridges: The Arab-Israeli Multilateral Talks* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).

62. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 9.

63. See also the report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, "Towards a Culture of Prevention," Chapter 7, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), 151-165.

64. Herbert C. Kelman, "Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli Palestinian Breakthrough" *Negotiation Journal* 11 (1995): 19-27.

65. "Gas Chamber Denial in the Palestinian Media," Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch No. 33 (20 May, 1999); "Holocaust Denial in the Syrian Media," Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI),

Special Dispatch No. 71 (2 February, 1999).

66. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 143.

67. Marie-France Desjardins, *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures: Obstacles to agreement and the risks of overselling the process*, Adelphi Paper 307, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 5.