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FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1999
ISRAELI ELECTIONS
Director, Program on Conflict Resolution and
Negotiation
and
BESA Center for Strategic Studies
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, Israel
Tel: 972-3-5318043
Fax: 972‑3‑5357931
Email: gerald@vms.huji.ac.il
“The Peace Process in the 1999 Israeli
Elections”, Israel Affairs, 7:2, Winter 2000
also in Israel at the
Polls:1999, (London: Frank Cass, 2001) Daniel Elazar and Ben
Mollov,editors.
The published text may
differ slightly from this version.
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1999
ISRAELI ELECTIONS
In 1996, Binyamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of Israel by the
narrowest of margins, following a series of deadly terrorist attacks that had a
profound impact on Israeli public opinion. The election results reflected a
rejection of the Labor government’s policies, and of Shimon Peres, in
particular, rather than an endorsement of Netanyahu and his policies.
Although the new government’s first priority focused on combating
terrorism, this could never be the only measure of success or failure, and in
order to be reelected, Netanyahu would have to deliver on his promise to
balance security and “peace.” A pragmatic policy demonstrating some progress in
the negotiations with the Palestinians and perhaps also Syria, along with a
strong stance in the face of terrorism and violence, would provide Netanyahu
with the continued support of the floating voters.
In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin led the Labor party to a narrow victory over
Yitzhak Shamir and the Likud on a platform of “peace with strength,” and in
1996, those voters who had swung to Rabin four year earlier were disenchanted
and voted for Netanyahu. These floating voters were not motivated by a
right-wing nationalist ideology, and to keep the margin of victory, Netanyahu
would have to maintain their support.
However, in 1999, Netanyahu failed, for a number of reasons, to hold
these floating voters, and both he and the Likud lost badly. The relatively
lower levels of terrorism, for which Netanyahu took credit, and the emphasis on
“reciprocity” and “lowering expectations” in negotiations with the
Palestinians, were insufficient for re-election.
With few accomplishments during his three years as prime minister,
Netanyahu’s reelection strategy was based on an attempt to return to the themes
of 1996. He tried to create a strong link between Barak and Peres, but failed.
Although Barak identified himself as Rabin’s political heir, he had always
distanced himself from the negotiations with the Palestinians, and never showed
a great deal of enthusiasm for the framework created in Oslo. During the
campaign, Barak emphasized his military career and, like Rabin, presented an
image of security and strength as the basis for peace in the region. His
campaign commercials stressed his military achievements, fighting terrorism and
insuring Israeli security. Barak’s statements on key issues, such as a
Palestinian state or withdrawal from the Golan Heights, were limited and
ambiguous, and he did not present a comprehensive plan or maps containing
possible boundaries. Peres and Beilin were largely hidden during the campaign,
and under these conditions, Netanyahu’s efforts to recycle successful themes of
the 1996 campaign against Peres were stillborn.
Indeed, throughout the campaign, Barak acted to preempt Netanyahu on the
issues that were used effectively in 1996. Barak emphasized his IDF record in
contributing to Israeli security and fighting terrorism. Early in the campaign,
polls showed that Netanyahu and Barak were rated virtually the same in terms of
fighting terrorism, and this trend continued until the end. (In January 1999,
polls showed that 42 percent of the voters rated Netanyahu as best in
“protecting Israel’s security,” versus 39 percent for Barak),[1] and in the last
week, when asked “Who do you think would handle terror better?,” 39 percent of the respondents rated Netanyahu
highest, and 38 percent named Barak.[2]
In analyzing the 1999 elections, it would be a mistake to argue that the
Middle East “peace process” and foreign policy issues, in general, were of
primary importance. When asked to rate issues in the order of importance, 39
percent of the respondents ranked domestic issues (economy/social welfare)
first, only 32 percent gave priority to “security/foreign affairs” issues,
while 27 percent rated them equally.[3] As the authors
of the other chapters in this volume demonstrate, the main issues resulted from
domestic (or “tribal”) concerns, such as religious-secular relations,
ethnicity, and Netanyahu’s personality and one-man governing “style,” rather
than his external policies.
However, policies relating to the negotiations with the Palestinians,
including Jerusalem and terrorism, as well as relations with the United States
and other foreign policy issues, were always in the background and played a
significant role in the 1999 election campaign. The Netanyahu government split
following the Wye River Memorandum that was signed in October 1998, and this
led directly to the decision to hold elections one year earlier than had been
scheduled. Thus, any analysis of the election campaign and its results must
hinge on the events that led to the Wye summit, the agreements that were
negotiated there, and their impact in Israel.
1996-1999: The Legacy of Reciprocity and Lowered Expectations
The Middle East peace process and, in particular, the negotiations with
the Palestinians over the implementation of the 1993 “Oslo agreement”
(Declaration of Principles — DOP), as well as subsequent accords, continued to
be the central foreign policy issues during Netanyahu’s era. The focus occasionally
shifted to Lebanon (see below) and, after the elections, Netanyahu and some of
his advisors claimed to have had intensive contacts with Syria. In general,
however, the Palestinian talks were central, beginning with the implementation
of the Hebron agreement (suspended by Peres following the suicide bombings) and
followed by discussion of the “further interim redeployments” agreed to in the
1995 Cairo accord.
In this context, “reciprocity” and “lowered expectations” were the
dominant themes of the Netanyahu era. Following his first meeting with Arafat,
and in public statements afterwards, Netanyahu declared an end to the pattern
established after the 1993 DOP, in which Israel implemented its commitments
while the Palestinians delayed or ignored theirs.[4] The process
would continue, he announced, but only with changes on the part of the
Palestinians[SF1]. In addition, he
emphasized the need to “lower expectations” regarding possible Israeli
concessions borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and other issues.
Whatever Netanyahu’s intentions, events in September 1996 contributed to
a climate of hostility and distrust that continued for the next three years.
The events began when the Israeli government opened an ancient tunnel in the Old
City of Jerusalem. This tunnel, which is parallel to the Western Wall, had long
been open at one end, but the exit, which opened into the Moslem Quarter, was
sealed. Both the Shamir and Rabin governments had approved the decision to
unseal the exit, but had delayed implementation in order to avoid a
confrontation in Jerusalem. Netanyahu, however, ordered the tunnel opened,
apparently in response to pressure from supporters and donors with strong
ideological agendas. The Palestinians responded violently, and in military
clashes across the country, 11 IDF soldiers were killed and 55 wounded.
Netanyahu and Arafat rushed to Washington for a crisis summit involving King
Hussein, which seemed to lead to a reconciliation of sorts. However, the tunnel
confrontation critically undermined the image of the Netanyahu government.
Nevertheless, the push continued to complete the implementation of the
Hebron agreement and return to the Oslo process, largely based on pressure from
the U.S. On January 15, 1997, Israel and the PA representatives met at the Erez
crossing between Gaza and Israel to sign a revised Hebron agreement. The text
was very similar to the earlier version negotiated in 1995, but added
specificity to the Palestinian obligations. More importantly, the agreement
seemed to indicate that Netanyahu and the Likud party had accepted and become
part of the Oslo process. All of the other agreements had been made by the
Labor party, amidst strenuous objections from the Likud.
However, a number of key figures in the Likud and in the government
coalition denounced the pact. Science Minister Binyamin Ze’ev Begin charged
that 80 percent of Hebron was being handed over to Palestinian control and
despite the claim of reciprocity, the old pattern of one-sided implementation
was continuing. Begin also warned that this was the “first step” in the
creation of a Palestinian state. “If we give in on Hebron, who can guarantee
that we will not capitulate elsewhere and reward Arafat for terror and
violations of the agreement?” Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon also
criticized Netanyahu, warning that he would lead a campaign to bring changes in
“a deal that endangers the lives of Israelis.” In addition, ministers from the
NRP and other parties in the coalition were strongly critical, and both Natan
Sharansky and Yuli Edelstein (Yisrael B’aliya) were not supportive.[5]
In the face of this criticism, Netanyahu sought to regain support on the
right by approving building on Har Homa, one of the last undeveloped areas in
the greater Jerusalem region. The Har Homa decision softened the censure
regarding Netanyahu’s decision to implement the Hebron agreement and thereby
become part of the Oslo process. However, for critics in the U.S. and Europe,
and on the left in Israel, this decision served as clear evidence of
Netanyahu’s insincerity with regard to the peace process (even though the
majority of the land of Har Homa was owned by Jews).[6]
The focus on Hebron and Har Homa faded in time, as the further
redeployments (FRD) that had been specified in the 1995 Interim (Cairo)
Agreement emerged as the central issue in Israeli foreign policy. Ultimately,
differences over these redeployments also brought down the Netanyahu government
and led to early elections.
The discussions on the FRD proceeded slowly and were halted after a
series of fatal terrorist attacks in March (in Tel Aviv), July, and September
1997 (in Jerusalem). Netanyahu stopped the talks, declaring “I want to make it
clear that we are not prepared to continue this way.” He blamed Arafat and the
PA for failing to take the necessary action against the terrorist
infrastructure in the areas under their control. “When the head of the PA
embraces and kisses Hamas instead of fighting it, the message is that Hamas can
strike at Israel with impunity.”[7]
After a period of relative calm, the discussions resumed, and in
December 1997, almost one year after the Hebron agreement, and after a great
deal of pressure (from the U.S. and internally, from officials such as Defense
Minister Yitzhak Mordechai), Netanyahu agreed, in principle, to implement the
second FRD. This decision again emphasized reciprocity, and was dependent on
Palestinian fulfillment of commitments contained in the annex to the Hebron
accord, including extradition of Palestinian terror suspects, decommissioning
of illegal weapons, and formalizing the amendments to the PLO Charter which
nullified the clauses that called for the destruction of Israel.
The extent of each FRD was not specified in the Cairo Agreement, and the
Netanyahu government sought to limit the second one to under 10 percent of the
remaining territory under Israeli control, while the U.S. insisted on “two
digits” or a number “in the teens.” A weakened Netanyahu opted to appoint Ariel
Sharon as foreign minister (ten months after the resignation of David Levy).
Sharon, who was a rival (Netanyahu had resisted appointing him to the cabinet
after the 1996 elections), was suddenly and implausibly seen by the U.S. as
more flexible than Netanyahu, and by the Israeli right as more reliable.
The impasse continued for many months, and during this period the
Palestinians threatened to abandon the Oslo process and issue a unilateral
declaration of independence (UDI). In October 1998, the U.S. pressed all the
parties to attend a summit meeting at Wye Plantation, and this meeting resulted
in an accord and timetable for implementation. Netanyahu won narrow cabinet
approval for the Wye accord, with eight ministers approving, four against, and
five abstaining. When the agreement was presented to the Knesset for approval,
seven cabinet members, including Likud ministers Limor Livnat, Silvan Shalom,
Moshe Katsav, Yehoshua Matza and Tzahi Hanegbi, were absent. The two National
Religious Party ministers, Shaul Yahalom and Yitzhak Levy, voted against the
accord, as did all the other NRP MKs. The government was in disarray and,
rather than facing defeat in the Knesset, decided to promote early elections,
which were approved by the Knesset on December 23, 1998.
The campaign began with the Wye agreement in the immediate background,
linked to the questions of the future of the Oslo process, the potential for
reaching a permanent status agreement, the impact of a Palestinian state, and
uncertainty over how policy on all of these issues would impact on Israeli
security, relations with the U.S., and also with the rest of the world. In
terms of foreign policy, these were the central issues in the election
campaign. This time, in contrast to 1996, Netanyahu had a record to defend and
was open to attack from both left and right. Begin and his National Union
party, as well as the NRP, attacked Netanyahu for willingness to continue the
Oslo process, which they charged would lead Israel to disaster.
From the other side of the political spectrum, Barak and the Labor party
(renamed “One Israel”) charged that Netanyahu had damaged Israeli security by
bringing the peace process to an impasse and by endangering Israel’s
long-standing partnership with the U.S.
The new Center party, led by former Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai,
who was dismissed by Netanyahu at the beginning of the campaign, also
criticized the government’s policies on the peace process. In repeated public
appearances, Mordechai blamed Netanyahu for allowing policy to be controlled by
“two or three extremist MKs.” Mordechai also accused Netanyahu of weakening
ties with Egypt, Jordan, and, in particular, the United States.[8] These general critiques
were repeated in the discussions of specific issues during the campaign.
In the televised debate between Netanyahu and Mordechai on April 13,
1999 (the only debate between candidates during the campaign), these issues
were discussed briefly. Netanyahu, who appeared unprepared for the
confrontation, used the debate to emphasize his policies of reciprocity and
claimed credit for reducing terrorism. Mordechai also claimed credit for these
achievements, while blaming Netanyahu for the Western Wall tunnel crisis, and
for creating a situation in which Israel was forced to make major concessions
at the Wye summit, asking “Who gave the Palestinians 13 percent? Not me, you
did.” (Mordechai also claimed that after eight months as defense minister, he
submitted his resignation due to dissatisfaction over Netanyahu’s handling of
these issues.) Netanyahu responded by citing Mordechai’s public praise of the
government’s policies.
Regarding settlements, there was also little substantive difference in
positions. Netanyahu restated an earlier pledge not to build new settlements,
but allow expansion of existing ones, while Mordechai called for limited
construction in areas that remained under full Israeli control.[9] However, as many
analysts and commentators noted, it was difficult to discern the policy
differences between the two candidates on these issues.
The Question of a Palestinian State
Netanyahu’s resistance to further redeployments, the demand for
fundamental changes in Palestinian policies and rhetoric (“reciprocity”), and
the threat of a unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence were closely
interrelated. As the process reached an impasse, the threat of a UDI became a
major focus of Israeli foreign policy, and also a central issue in the election
campaign.
According to the 1993 Oslo agreement, the permanent status negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians were to be concluded within five years
after the Gaza-Jericho agreement. The deadline for permanent status was May 4,
1999. This date was less than two weeks before the Israeli elections, and the
Palestinian threat to issue a UDI hovered over the campaign from the beginning.
If the Palestinians were to proceed with a UDI, this would become a major issue
in the Israeli elections and might increase support for Netanyahu.
The Palestinians emphasized this issue, in large part, in order to
obtain the maximum payoff from the EU and the U.S. for not proceeding with a
UDI. In early January, 1991, PA Planning Minister Nabil Shaath declared that
Israel’s expansion of settlements and suspension of the Wye agreement had left
the Palestinian Authority with no alternative but to proceed with the
declaration of an independent Palestinian state. “There has been no change in
the policy of the Palestinian Authority on this matter, the declaration is on
track, and what makes it even more so is the total lack of implementation of
the Wye agreement and the total lack of progress on permanent status.”[10]
Netanyahu’s spokesman blamed the Palestinians for “breaking the Wye
agreement” by unilaterally planning to declare the establishment of a state.[11] The prime
minister declared that in response to a UDI, he would consider annexation of
some or all of Judea and Samaria. “Israel reserves the right to extend Israeli
law to the territories under its control if Arafat and the Palestinians violate
the agreements they have signed.”[12] Netanyahu also
declared that “We will continue to adhere to our firm and clear policy which
does not allow for the creation of a Palestinian state in the heart of the Land
of Israel, and we will not allow Jerusalem to be redivided.”[13]
For Barak and the One Israel party, the Palestinian statements regarding
a UDI posed a difficult dilemma. A maximalist declaration, as discussed by many
PA leaders, could persuade floating voters to support Netanyahu, and might have
led many potential Barak supporters to waiver. If the Palestinian borders were
defined as “the borders of June 4, 1967, including all of the West Bank, Gaza
Strip, and the part of Jerusalem that was on the Jordanian side of the
armistice line,”[14] this would harm
Barak. On the other hand, a postponement of the decision could be interpreted
as a blatant Palestinian effort to assist Barak’s campaign. Likud MK Uzi
Landau, who contested the Likud leadership for a brief period, predicted that
the Palestinians would defer declaring statehood in order to help Barak and the
left in the election. “It is a fact that if they delayed it, it would be in the
interest of helping the Labor party.”[15] In response,
Barak charged that Netanyahu was responsible for the worldwide support that the
Palestinians were receiving for efforts to declare a state. The government’s
policies were blamed for “creating a Palestinian state at Wye,” and for
inviting “Clinton to Gaza to inaugurate that state.”[16]
On this issue, as on others, the shadow of Shimon Peres (in second
position on the One Israel Knesset list) did not contribute to Barak’s
strategy. During the first weeks of the campaign (January 11), Peres became the
first Israeli to address the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), meeting in
Ramallah. In “a show of support for Palestinian statehood,” Peres, joined by
major international figures who had been invited by the Peres Center for Peace,
declared that “it is our deep hope not only that the Palestinian people will
gain independence, but it is our common interest to see a Palestinian state
take place as a result of an agreement — a state that lives democratically and
flourishes economically.” Ahmed Qurei (Abu Alla), Speaker of the PLC, called
for “an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.”[17]
Similarly, the Likud and the Netanyahu government did not speak with a
single voice on this issue. In its campaign platform, Likud pledged to continue
implementation of the Wye accords subject to “reciprocity,” to strengthen the
Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, and to prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian state.[18]
However, newly appointed Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon indicated that he
was prepared to accept a Palestinian state. At the same time, he repeated
Netanyahu’s warning that in response to a UDI, Israel would annex all the
territories under its control. (“There is no question of our trying to recover
Gaza, Nablus, or Jenin,...but all the rest that is in our hands today will
remain so.”)[19]
For Netanyahu, it was far easier to campaign against Arafat than against
Barak. During the campaign, Netanyahu warned the Palestinians that “If you
violate the agreements, and you unilaterally declare a state with Jerusalem as
its capital...you should know that we will respond aggressively.…We are not
willing to give in. You act unilaterally, we act unilaterally, and this will
not be good for the Palestinians and it will not be good for peace.”[20] To add credibility,
at least in terms of the election race, the government leaked information on
military contingency plans (Field of Thorns) in response to violence associated
with a Palestinian move in this direction.[21] In response,
Arafat declared, “The Palestinians are ready to take up arms against Israel to
defend their legitimate rights at any time, first and foremost their right to
declare an independent state,” allowing Netanyahu to declare “Israel will
respond in the strongest possible way, causing the Palestinian Authority to
only lose and to gain nothing by such a move.”[22]
However, for the U.S. and Europe, the threats of violence increased the
importance of postponing a UDI until after the Israeli elections. U.S.
officials acknowledged that “Both Arafat and we want to get by May 4 and May
17. We think he understands the need to delay.”[23] Similarly,
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak told Arafat not to proceed with a UDI in order
to avoid helping Netanyahu.[24]
Netanyahu charged that Arafat’s tactics were aimed primarily at
influencing the Israeli elections, and as a result, the threat of a UDI was not
real.[25] Instead,
Netanyahu noted that Arafat’s real objective was to extract a range of pledges
from the U.S. and Europe, in exchange for postponing the declaration until
after the Israeli elections.[26]
Netanyahu also ran against European policy with respect to the
Palestinians, and invoked the Holocaust. After the Berlin Declaration, in which
the European Union formally expressed its support for a Palestinian state, Netanyahu
declared, it is “regretful that Europe, where a third of the Jewish people
perished, would see fit to attempt to impose a solution that endangers the
state of Israel and its interests.”[27] (One Israel also
saw the EU’s declaration as a liability. MK Shlomo Ben-Ami said the EU
resolution of support for a Palestinian state was unnecessary and harmful.
However, he also noted that it reflects “the collapse of Israel’s international
relations under the Netanyahu government. Netanyahu is endangering Israel’s
strategic security.”)[28] Similarly, the
Netanyahu government condemned European support for the resolution passed by
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva calling for Palestinian
self-determination on the basis of the UN partition resolution of 1947 (Res.
181) and for the “right of return” for refugees (Res. 194). The failure to
mention UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 drew particular anger.[29]
Industry and Trade Minister Natan Sharansky also warned the Americans
and Europeans against giving in to Arafat’s blackmail and extortion. While
visiting Ukraine, Netanyahu also appealed to the hawkish Russian and FSU voters
in Israel, warning that “The Palestinian Authority and its leaders dare not
unilaterally declare a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital….Israel
will respond in the harshest way possible.[30]
By mid-March, this issue had lost salience, and Netanyahu was seeking to
position himself back towards the center of the political spectrum. He again
pledged that the Oslo process, including permanent status talks, would resume
after the elections. Claiming that “the Palestinians have lowered their
expectations since I came into office,” he said that the territorial issues
would not lead to an impasse.[31] One Israel carefully
positioned itself in between, criticizing both Netanyahu and Arafat for
threatening violence. “The only way to resolve the issues between the sides is
by restarting the stalled peace process and rebuilding the trust between the
parties that was snuffed out in the last three years.”[32] When PA official
Nabil Shaath revealed that in 1995, MK Yossi Beilin had agreed to accept a
Palestinian state, there was little impact on the electorate.[33]
In April, one month before the elections, Barak broke the pattern of
ambiguity, issuing his first clear policy statement on permanent status issues.
The policy included four points: a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty;
no return to the 1967 borders; no foreign military presence west of the Jordan
River; and the annexation into Israel of most of the settlers living in
concentrated areas near the old border. He also pledged to submit any peace
agreement with the Palestinians to a national referendum.[34]
This statement was strongly criticized by Meretz, and provided its
leaders with the opportunity to position themselves to the left of One Israel
and Barak. Yossi Sarid declared, “Every kid in the country knows there will be
a Palestinian state, and it would be good if Barak, a candidate for prime
minister, knew what every child knows. If we are going to a referendum for a
final status deal, the upcoming elections are redundant.”[35] In a major
public rally, leaders declared that Meretz would be “the first to recognize” a
Palestinian state.
When Arafat and the PA officially backed down from UDI before May 4,
Netanyahu declared victory, claiming that the Palestinians “know that as long
as I am prime minister there will be no Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its
capital. He [Arafat] is waiting until after the elections, because he is hoping
the government will change.” In a press conference on May 5, Netanyahu, Sharon
and Arens claimed credit for the outcome. “This did not happen by itself,”
Netanyahu said. “For a whole year, Arafat promised dozens of times that he
would declare an independent Palestinian state today, and that he would also
declare the division of Jerusalem. For a whole year we warned him against doing
this.…He understood that we were determined in our responses and that a
government headed by me would never allow anybody to unilaterally determine the
fate of the State of Israel and its permanent borders, and therefore he changed
his mind.”[36]
Barak responded, saying: “For a long time it has been clear that Arafat
will not unilaterally declare statehood....Netanyahu did not stop anything; all
that he has done is alienate Israel internationally....With the U.S. behind the
Palestinians, we have lost all our negotiating leverage.”[37] He charged that
rather than preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state, Netanyahu was
responsible for creating it. “According to Netanyahu’s own ministers, Sharon
and Arens included, Netanyahu has created a de facto Palestinian state. He
helped give it life at Wye, he ratified it with Clinton’s visit to Gaza that he
organized, and stamped it into everyone’s minds with the letter from
Clinton...and all this has done nothing but hurt Israel’s negotiating
position.” At the same time, Barak declared that he, too, would never allow a
unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. “I say here clearly: In the
future, in a government under my leadership, we will not allow a unilateral
declaration. The only place to discuss matters having to do with the future of
the Palestinians is in negotiations.”[38]
Despite the relatively intense debate and focus on the issue of
Palestinian statehood, the related questions regarding the Wye Agreement, and
the future of the negotiations, the evidence (primarily from polls) indicates
that these events did not have a significant impact on voter preferences.
Indeed, from the beginning of the campaign in January, public opinion polls
showed that 50 percent of the public believed that Barak would “best advance
the peace process,” while only 35 percent chose Netanyahu in response to this
question.[39] In May, during
the last week before the elections), 44 percent chose Barak as the candidate
“more appropriate to carry out the permanent agreement with the Palestinians,”
compared to 34 percent for Netanyahu.[40]
In a broader sense, the impact of the debate over this issue on the
campaign itself was minimal. Although Barak lost some ground in the polls,
Netanyahu failed to gain support and remained far behind Barak’s approval
rating in this area. As will be seen below, this was also the case as other
issues arose and declined.
VOTER PREFERENCES FROM JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1999
(in percentages)
1. First round:
|
Date |
Netanyahu |
Barak |
Mordechai |
Begin |
Bashara |
|
May 14, 1999 |
38 |
44 |
6 |
3 |
3 |
|
May 7, 1999 |
37 |
42 |
7 |
3 |
4 |
|
April 30, 1999 |
37 |
37 |
10 |
3 |
3 |
|
April 13, 1999 |
33 |
34 |
17 |
4 |
3 |
|
March 29, 1999 |
36 |
33 |
17 |
4 |
|
|
March 24, 1999 |
38 |
36 |
15 |
n.a. |
|
|
March 17, 1999 |
33 |
31 |
19 |
n.a. |
|
|
March 10, 1999 |
33 |
31 |
18 |
4 |
|
|
March 3, 1999 |
35 |
30 |
19 |
5 |
|
|
February 19, 1999 |
37 |
30 |
20 |
4 |
|
|
January 29, 1999 |
35 |
28 |
18 |
5 |
|
2. Second round (Barak vs. Netanyahu)
|
Date |
Netanyahu |
Barak |
|
May 14, 1999 |
41 |
51 |
|
May 7, 1999 |
42 |
50 |
|
April 30, 1999 |
42 |
50 |
|
April 14, 1999 |
42 |
47 |
|
March 31, 1999 |
43 |
46 |
|
March 10, 1999 |
41 |
46 |
|
March 3, 1999 |
44 |
45 |
|
February 19, 1999 |
47 |
44 |
|
January 29, 1999 |
46 |
43 |
|
January 15, 1999 |
43 |
43 |
|
January 8, 1999 |
40 |
45 |
|
January 1, 1999 |
40 |
45 |
|
December 25, 1998 |
42 |
44 |
|
October 1, 1998 |
42 |
41 |
|
August 5, 1998 |
44 |
43 |
|
May 20, 1998 |
43 |
43 |
|
May 6, 1998 |
40 |
40 |
Yediot Ahronot, 14 May 1999 — results of a survey carried out by
Dahaf
the week of May 14, 1999 of a representative sample of 1,100 Israeli
adults. Survey error +/- 3 percentage points.
Jerusalem
In the 1996 election campaign, Netanyahu and the Likud made Jerusalem an
important issue, charging that Peres and the Labor party were willing to make
concessions and “redivide” Israel’s capital. This strategy was effective,
particularly when details were published on the ongoing discussions between
Labor party officials and Palestinian negotiators, including the Beilin-Abu
Mazen talks.
In 1999, after three years of a Likud-led government, the situation was
quite different, but Netanyahu and the Likud sought to inject the Jerusalem
issue in the campaign. In mid-March, the EU issued a formal statement
reiterating the long-standing European policy that does not recognize Israeli
sovereignty in Jerusalem. The statement linked the European policy to UN
Resolution 181, adopted in November 1947, which called for a partition of the
area contained in mandated Palestine, with Jerusalem becoming a “corpus separatum.”
The use of this outdated resolution as the basis for policy on Jerusalem after
so many years and events, including the 1948-1967 period during which Jewish
Jerusalem was occupied and systematically desecrated, alienated a wide spectrum
of Israelis.
These events provided Netanyahu and Sharon with the opportunity to
demonstrate their commitment to Jerusalem in the face of external pressure, and
to place themselves in the forefront of the battle to prevent the redivision of
the city. In a public message to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer,
Sharon reiterated “in the most sincere yet firm manner Israel’s determination —
a determination shared by all shades of opinion in Israel — not to allow
Jerusalem to become, once again, a divided and separated city.”[41] In public
appearances before foreign representatives, Netanyahu and Sharon stressed this
theme. In one such briefing, Sharon pointedly welcomed the ambassadors to
“Jerusalem, the capital of the Jewish people for the last 3,000 years and the
capital of Israel for the last 50 years.” He also recounted his own history in
the battle for Jerusalem in 1948, noting “It is very hard to imagine that after
all those years we again have to struggle for Jerusalem.” Agreeing to place
Jerusalem on the negotiating table at Oslo was a “major mistake” of the Labor
government, but he pledged that if the Likud led the next government, “the
negotiations about Jerusalem will be very short.”[42]
In late March, American policy regarding recognition of Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital (a sore point in bilateral relations) was debated in
Washington in the context of congressional action designed to press the Clinton
Administration to change its position on this issue. In this framework,
Netanyahu reasserted his claim to be the most reliable defender of Israeli
interests in Jerusalem.[43] A few days
later, the government ordered two offices in Jerusalem linked to the PA to be
closed. Netanyahu claimed that this move was in response to “increased illegal
PA political activities in Jerusalem.”[44] However,
Netanyahu was careful to avoid confrontation, which would have revived memories
of the tunnel crisis of 1996, and he readily accepted a court decision
postponing the closure decision regarding the offices. Claiming victory, he
declared “The activities in the offices themselves have been stopped and will
be moved outside of Jerusalem to Palestinian territory. Our goal is to stop the
activity there and that is what we have done.”[45]
In late April, following a series of highly publicized meetings on
Israeli Independence Day between Palestinian officials and foreign
representatives at Orient House in Jerusalem, the status of this building
became an issue again. In the past, efforts by the PA to use this building to
establish an official presence in Jerusalem had led to friction with Israel,
and the potential for a major confrontation existed whenever activities at
Orient House became salient.
Indeed, given the timing and situation, these meetings seemed designed
to provoke an angry response from the Likud government (and failure to act
would have been politically costly). Netanyahu responded immediately, declaring
“The time has come for Orient House to be shut, or at least for the Palestinian
offices there to be shut.”[46] Internal
Security Minister Avigdor Kahalani was given the responsibility of issuing
closure orders against PA offices in Orient House “which are operating
illegally.”[47] (Kahalani,
however, was careful to avoid a violent confrontation.) In parallel, Netanyahu
charged that, “The Labor party’s policy is not a secret. It is a fact that when
Barak was foreign minister [in the former Labor government], he did not lift a
finger to close Orient House.” In another appearance, Netanyahu escalated the
rhetoric. “If [Barak] were elected, he would divide and divide….[Labor MK
Yossi] Beilin agreed with Abu Mazen that 95 percent of the territory of Judea
and Samaria would be transferred to a Palestinian state whose capital would in
fact be Jerusalem, and which would also include part of the Negev....It has
been proven time and time again that Beilin says aloud what Barak and his
friends think in their hearts.”[48] (In an
unauthorized Russian version of Barak’s biography, arranged and distributed by
Likud, Barak is quoted as being in favor of accepting a Palestinian presence in
Jerusalem.)[49]
As noted above, the Palestinian declarations regarding Jerusalem played
an important part in the campaign. When Netanyahu took credit for preventing
the creation of a Palestinian state, he appealed to floating voters, reminding
them of the Palestinian demand to make Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian
state. “For a whole year, Arafat promised dozens of times that he would declare
an independent Palestinian state today, and that he would also declare the
division of Jerusalem. For a whole year we warned him against doing this.”[50]
The responses of Ehud Barak and One Israel were engaged but relatively
low key. Campaign ads featured Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert, a staunch member of
Likud (but a rival of Netanyahu) declaring his faith that “Barak will not
divide Jerusalem.” Many analysts, as well as Labor officials, noted that the
activities in eastern Jerusalem and in Orient House were far from new, and the
major reason for taking action seemed to be linked to the election campaign.
Labor MK Binyamin Ben-Eliezer stated that “The prime minister wants now, three
weeks before the election, to introduce some order into something over which he
has not been able to establish control for the past three years.” Meretz leader
Yossi Sarid accused the government of “showing more and more worrisome signs of
political adventurism as window-dressing, which only deepens the rift between
the Netanyahu government and the Palestinians.”[51]
The Jerusalem issue, like the UDI and the question of a Palestinian
state, did not emerge as decisive issues in the campaign. As the results
demonstrated, Netanyahu’s emphasis on these issues failed to stem the defection
of voters who had supported him and the Likud in 1996. The situation had
changed during the previous three years, and other issues unrelated to foreign
or security policy emerged as the central factors in the outcome.
The Role of the Clinton Administration
In both the 1992 and 1996 Israeli elections, the United States
government pursued policies that reflected a strong effort to influence the
outcome. In 1992, after a series of public clashes related to the Madrid peace
conference, the Bush administration helped to defeat the Likud government under
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.[52] In 1996,
President Clinton and officials of his administration, including U.S.
Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, campaigned quite openly and unsuccessfully
for Shimon Peres.[53] This partisan
role was responsible in large part for the disharmony that characterized
relations between Washington and Jerusalem from the beginning of the Netanyahu
government.
Throughout this period, relations continued to deteriorate, and
Netanyahu’s surrender to American pressure at the Wye Plantation summit meeting
in October 1996 failed to change the atmosphere. (Netanyahu agreed to attend
this summit, in part, due to the imminent confrontation between the U.S. and
Iraq. The Clinton Administration argued that the reluctance of the Arab states
to provide military and diplomatic support for this confrontation was, in large
part, a reflection of dissatisfaction with Israeli policies in the peace
process. By accepting the conditions of the Wye agreement, Netanyahu also
sought to avoid being blamed by the U.S. for inaction over Iraq.)
In the wake of the decision to back the wrong horse during the previous
campaign, and the criticism for attempting to interfere in Israel’s internal
affairs, the role of the U.S. government in the 1999 elections was relatively
limited. Indeed, as soon as elections were called, Clinton administration
officials lowered their profile significantly. For all intents and purposes,
the efforts to implement the terms of the Wye agreement were frozen, pending
the outcome of the elections. The American Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Edward
Walker, carefully avoided repeating the mistakes of his predecessors.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government could not disappear entirely from the
Middle East and did not suspend its new relations with the Palestinians during
this period. After the suicide bombings that led to the defeat of Labor and
Peres, and to Netanyahu’s election in 1996, Washington sought to prevent
actions that would have a similar impact. As noted above, the U.S. was
centrally involved in the efforts to dissuade Arafat and the Palestinians from
a unilateral declaration of independence on May 4, 1999.
As part of these efforts, in January 1999, Dennis Ross (the State
Department’s Middle East peace process coordinator) made another visit to the
region. Although the focus of his trip was to meet with Arafat and the PA, he
also met with Netanyahu. (If Ross had not met with the Israeli prime minister,
this would have been interpreted as a deliberate snub and as a direct American
attempt to influence the campaign.) In public statements, Ross was very
cautious, carefully avoiding endorsing Netanyahu’s claims regarding Palestinian
failures to implement commitments under the Wye accord, but also not
contradicting these claims. Emphasizing efforts to lower the American profile,
Ross noted that the U.S. intended to play a limited role in the final-status
negotiations. Although the U.S. remained committed to the process, he stressed
that the U.S. role in the final-status talks would be to “reassure, clarify,
facilitate, and sometimes mediate.”[54]
However, as the campaign progressed and Barak maintained and then
increased his lead, and Palestinian compliance and a UDI became major issues,
Ross and other officials became less cautious and less hesitant to disagree
with Netanyahu. Refuting Netanyahu’s claims, he noted that the Palestinians
have “worked to carry out many of their commitments — many, but not all,”
particularly with respect to fighting terror and confiscating weapons.[55]
Visits by Arafat and other PA officials to Washington, while Netanyahu
was persona non-grata, emphasized the rift. In February, Arafat was invited to
the annual Congressional Prayer Breakfast, and also to the White House, in the
context of a discussion of the UDI issue.[56] Two weeks later,
a high level PA delegation met with Secretary of State Albright in Washington.
These highly publicized meetings provided a stark contrast to the cold stares
exchanged between Clinton and Netanyahu.[57]
On other occasions, the U.S. government indicated its preference for
candidates other than Netanyahu. In January, for example, Clinton publicly
commended former Defense Minister Mordechai for his “Middle East peace-making
efforts.” This public endorsement was an implicit criticism of Netanyahu and
came at a crucial period at the beginning of the campaign when Mordechai was
considering whether to become a candidate. Clinton’s letter to Mordechai noted
that “good will and political courage” are needed to implement the Wye accord.
(Mordechai had secretly met Palestinian officials “in order to preserve
cooperation in security and intelligence...and to keep channels open.”)[58]
In mid-March, the visibility of the tensions between the Clinton
administration and Netanyahu increased significantly. Responding to Palestinian
demands for concrete American gestures in return for postponement of a UDI,
Ross strongly criticized Israel’s settlement policies, and called for an agreed
time limit for the final-status talks. In an interview prior to another meeting
with Arafat, Ross stated that “We see settlement activity as very destructive
to the pursuit of peace.” Linking settlements to the UDI threat, he declared,
“We do not see any issue of the permanent status being resolved by either
unilateral declarations or by unilateral moves on the ground.” Ross also
restated the Clinton administration’s claim that while the Palestinians had
carried out “some” of their peace obligations, “at this point the Israelis have
not yet carried out any of their phase-two obligations.”[59]
These proclamations brought an angry reaction from the Netanyahu
government, which claimed that the Americans were again attempting to influence
the results of the Israeli elections. In this campaign, as in the past, the
Likud sought to gain support by claiming that outside forces, such as the U.S.
government, were attempting to influence the outcome. David Bar-Illan,
Netanyahu’s political confidant and communications director, rejected Ross’s
statements on settlements, stating that “criticism of the activities in these
communities only serves to prejudice the outcome of the final-status talks.”
Minister of Commerce and Industry Natan Sharansky criticized the American
government statements, observing that Arafat’s threats to declare a state are
no more than “unending blackmail” without significance, because “the moment he
pronounces independence the peace process is over.”[60]
Nevertheless, the repeated meetings between Palestinians and American
officials during this period contrasted starkly with the lack of any contact
between Netanyahu and the Clinton administration. When asked about this issue,
Netanyahu responded tersely, asking “What, do I have to stand in line at the
White House? We are not knocking on anyone’s door and have not asked for any
meetings.”[61]
At the end of March, Arafat again went to Washington to meet with
President Clinton at the White House, obtaining an American commitment to press
for accelerated permanent status negotiations. After the meeting, U.S. official
stated that “we would like to see a resumption of permanent status
negotiations. Realistically they are not going to resume until after the
Israeli elections, but [the talks] should not be on an open-ended basis.”[62] At the same
time, the Americans continued to reject pressures for a commitment to recognize
a Palestinian state a year later, or at some point in the process. Such a
commitment would clearly have triggered an angry reaction from Netanyahu, and
might have damaged Barak’s campaign. Clinton also sought to downplay the
meeting with Arafat, and avoided speaking to reporters.
In late April, just before the May 4 deadline, the U.S. government
provided a letter to the Palestinians in return for the decision to forgo the
UDI. The public summary of the letter stated that “The United States calls on
both parties to engage in accelerated permanent-status talks and to rededicate
themselves to the goal of reaching an agreement within a year.”[63]
In the last weeks before the election, the issue of American policy with
respect to Jerusalem also arose. In 1995, the U.S. Congress had passed the
Embassy Relocation Act, which called for moving the American embassy from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem. For a number of years, President Clinton had used his powers
under the act to postpone implementation, and was poised to do so again in
1999. At this stage, the Republican-controlled Congress, which was generally
allied with Netanyahu against Clinton, emphasized the issue. Simultaneously,
Netanyahu sought to use the Jerusalem issue against Barak in the Israeli
election campaign. As a result, the Congressional action seemed to support
Netanyahu, while working against Barak.[64] At this stage,
however, Congress delayed consideration of the issue until after the Israeli
elections.
By carefully monitoring the political situation in Israel, and keeping a
relatively low profile during the period of the campaign, in contrast to 1996,
the U.S. government avoided blatant involvement in the campaign. To the degree
that the Clinton administration was active, this was designed to convince the
Palestinians to avoid steps or actions that would lead to instability and would
aid Netanyahu in the campaign. In this sense, the involvement of the U.S.
government can be said to have been indirect and consistent with its overall
political objectives in the Middle East.
The Lebanon Issue
During the 1999 Israeli election campaign, the ongoing war in southern
Lebanon issue became a central focus (albeit briefly), following a series of
Hizbollah attacks and Israeli casualties. Three years earlier, in the midst of
the 1996 campaign, Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered a major Israeli military
operation (“Grapes of Wrath”) in response to a series of Hizbollah attacks on
Kiryat Shemona and the Northern Galillee. This operation did not lead to a
fundamental change in the situation, did not help Peres, and may have
contributed to his defeat and to Netanyahu’s victory.[65] In 1999, despite
some similar factors, this history was not repeated, and in the face of
continued attacks and casualties, the Netanyahu government refrained from
undertaking a major military operation. However, for a number of weeks, the
question of how to resolve the “Lebanese problem” became the focus of the
campaign.
Polls showed that on this issue, Barak had a distinct advantage, and
voters were critical of the way in which the government handled the conflict in
Lebanon. In February, polls revealed that 63 percent of the respondents
rejected the view that “the present government is doing enough to solve the
situation in Lebanon,” while only 29 percent agreed with this thesis.[66]
During the Netanyahu era, the costs of the Israeli presence in southern
Lebanon (the “security zone”) continued to grow, without progress in efforts to
reach a resolution. The 1996 operation ended with an unsigned understanding
involving Israel, Lebanon, the U.S. and France. Under this arrangement, Israel
and Hizbollah agreed to refrain from attacking civilians or using civilian
zones (villages, schools, farms, etc.) to launch attacks. Representatives of
each of the parties meet periodically in Nakura, Lebanon to consider claims of
violations, with no visible substantive results. In 1997, the collision of two
helicopters transporting troops to Lebanon killed 73 soldiers and marked a
turning point in the public debate. Protest groups, such as the Four Mothers,
were formed in support of unilateral withdrawal. They organized demonstrations
at the entrances to military bases, at street corners, and in front of
government offices, and also sponsored and participated in public debates
involving policy-makers, academics, and journalists.
In early 1999, during the first phase of the election campaign, a series
of Hizbollah attacks resulted in the deaths of a number of Israeli officers,
including the commander of forces in Lebanon. Israel retaliated by striking
Hizbollah bases in the Balbek area (despite the presence of Syrian forces), and
with very demonstrative overflights of Beirut. This served to warn of possible
escalation, but stopped short of an operation similar to those of 1993 and
1996.
At this point, the future of Lebanon became a central campaign issue.
While the party platforms of Labor and Likud avoided formally spelling out a
formula for resolving this issue, in a broad sense the two main parties adopted
different and opposing approaches. Labor emphasized efforts to find a solution
in the framework of an agreement with Syria, and the Likud preferred to
disconnect Lebanon from Syria. However, as will be discussed in detail below,
this debate crosses party lines. For example, while Ariel Sharon and Gidon
Ezra, of the Likud favored unilateral withdrawal, Uzi Landau and many other MKs
were strongly opposed. Similarly, in the Labor party, Yossi Beilin favored the
unilateral withdrawal option while Efraim Sneh and Ori Orr were opposed.
As prime minister, Netanyahu undertook a number of initiatives but
without results. In January 1997, Israel proposed the “Lebanon First” plan,
including Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the deployment of the
Lebanese army over areas that Israel would vacate, and the disarming of
Hizbollah. The details were similar to earlier proposals prepared by the late
Prime Minister Rabin, with the important difference that they were not linked
to formal approval from Syria. The Syrians predictably firmly rejected this
proposal, and Lebanon followed the Syrian lead. (After the Syrian response,
Netanyahu noted the “Kafkaesque” situation in which “the Prime Minister of
Israel announces he wants to get out of the territory of an Arab state, and the
Syrian government, together with the Lebanese, are opposing this withdrawal.”)
In early 1998, following more attacks and Israeli casualties, Netanyahu
launched his second initiative on Lebanon, based on UN Security Council
Resolution 425 (originally adopted in 1978), which called for Israeli
withdrawal to the international border, the return of Lebanese authority, and
the restoration of international peace and security. For twenty years,
successive Israel governments from both Labor and Likud, had rejected this
formula as one-sided. The change in policy reflected war weariness and the
increasing cost of the fighting. It was strongly supported by Defense Minister
Yitzhak Mordechai, who had served as head of the Northern Command while in the
IDF. However, despite the intensive diplomatic activity involving France and
the U.S., the Syrian government rejected the Israeli initiative. As the result
of Syrian pressure, Lebanon also rejected the proposal, claiming that the
security arrangements sought by Israel were not mentioned in Resolution 425.[67]
As noted, Ariel Sharon was appointed as foreign minister shortly before the
Wye Plantation summit and the resulting decision to hold early elections.[68] Sharon also
became involved in the discussion of the Lebanese issue, proposing a unilateral
staged withdrawal in which the IDF would redeploy its forces to the Israeli
side of the border in stages, based on the degree to which this was accompanied
by a reduction in attacks on northern Israel.[69] Although no
formal negotiated agreement would be required,
responsibility for Israeli security would be in the hands of the Lebanese government.
In Sharon’s plan, Israel would announce a date for the start of such a
withdrawal and warn, in advance, that the IDF would react immediately and
forcefully should the North come under attack. (This
is consistent with Sharon overall strategic approach, which emphasizes
deterrence.) However, critics argued that a partial withdrawal would leave
Hizbollah with the ability to claim that it was fighting to liberate Lebanese
territory, while at the same time increasing the dangers to the Israeli and SLA
troops that remained in the security zone.
During the campaign, following the ambushes in which IDF officers were
killed in Lebanon, Netanyahu seemed to indicate greater support for the
unilateral option but opposed Sharon’s proposal for a staged withdrawal. In
public statements, he declared that “We have to be concerned with protecting
the North and defending our allies [in southern Lebanon], which is not easy.” [70] Following
Barak’s pledge to withdraw Israeli troops within a year after elections (see
the detailed discussion below), Netanyahu declared that a year would be enough
for him to leave Lebanon, either through a deal with Syria or unilaterally. “I
estimate that we will find a way, by one of these two possibilities, to get the
army out in the coming year. I will, of course, not commit to an iron date.” He
said he would not pay an “exaggerated price” for an agreement with Syria, and
charged that Barak and the Labor party would “give away too much on the Golan.” At the same time, he did not “rule out a unilateral
withdrawal, on condition that there are security assurances.” Netanyahu’s
office later clarified this statement, declaring that there has been no
substantial change in his position. “The option of a unilateral withdrawal is
long-standing and is only one of several possible solutions being considered by
the cabinet....In any case, a unilateral withdrawal is dependent on reaching
security assurances.” On another
occasion, he stated that “If there is willingness on the part of the Lebanese
to arrive at such security arrangements, they will find the government of
Israel a willing and ready partner to arrive at such security arrangements that
would facilitate the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon.”
As Israeli military casualties mounted in 1999, Netanyahu criticized the
1996 Grapes of Wrath understandings and also blamed Barak (who was foreign
minister at the time). As a result of these agreements, for the first time,
“the government of Israel recognized the Hizbollah’s right to strike at IDF
soldiers and tied the hands of the IDF by not allowing it to strike in the
cities and villages, at the headquarters embedded in civilian residential
areas.”
For Barak, the ongoing war in Lebanon provided another opportunity to
distinguish his policies from those of Netanyahu. Barak’s record on this issue
was quite consistent. As chief of staff during the Rabin government, he
strongly advocated negotiation with Damascus in order to remove Syria from the
cycle of conflict, in a manner similar to the case of Egypt. Barak worked with
Rabin in developing Israel’s negotiating position with Syria, and participated
in the first meetings between the Israeli and Syrian Chiefs of Staff in 1994.
This approach is also consistent with the policies pursued by Israel while
Barak served as foreign minister during the Peres government following the
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin.
At the beginning of the campaign in December 1998 when the Lebanese
issue became central, Barak declared that as prime minister, he would resume
negotiations with Syria to facilitate a solution to the Lebanon problem,
including the possibility of a gradual withdrawal. “We have to find a way to
protect Israel’s interests and reach an arrangement with the Syrians.…This is
the way to solve the Lebanon problem, with a deep, fundamental solution.”[71] (Polls showed that Barak
supporters tended to be more willing to accept a unilateral withdrawal. In
February 1999, respondents who identified themselves as Barak supporters were
divided evenly on this issue, while Netanyahu supporters opposed unilateral
withdrawal by 63 percent to 24 percent. Some 77 percent of Barak supporters
also endorsed a withdrawal on the basis of an agreement with Syria, in contrast
to only 33 percent among Netanyahu supporters.)[72]
Following the incidents in Lebanon in March 1999, Barak returned to this
issue. In addition to attacking Netanyahu for failing to make any headway
during his term in office, Barak made a commitment to withdraw the IDF from
Lebanon by June 2000. He criticized Netanyahu’s approach to the problem, saying
that he is “running after the mosquitoes” instead of working to “dry up the
swamp.” As part of the plan, Barak said
he would resume peace talks with Syria. In
an important campaign appearance before a high school group following Hizbollah
attacks in which a number of Israeli officers were killed, Barak said “Your
year is the last that has a chance of seeing Lebanon from the other side of the
border...my government will bring the boys home by June 2000.” This was the most
significant and dramatic statement on Lebanon during the campaign, and set the
framework for further discussion of this issue.
Within the ranks of the Labor party, as noted, different views were
expressed. Yossi Beilin was a vocal advocate of unilateral unconditional
withdrawal, and in December 1998 Beilin criticized the Netanyahu government for
“gambling there every day, every minute, with the lives of our soldiers,” and
called the government’s policy a “march of folly.”[73]
The leaders of the other parties also became involved in the debate on
Lebanon. Yossi Sarid, who headed the Meretz party, and Yitzhak Mordechai of the
Center party strongly opposed any form of unilateral withdrawal. During the
campaign, Mordechai emphasized the link between negotiations with Syria and the
solution to the Lebanon problem. He claimed that an agreement on Lebanon could
be reached in talks with Syria in the context of a “territorial compromise” on
the Golan Heights.[74]
In March 1999, following the escalation of Hizbollah attacks, Mordechai
repeated this view. He said he would “work for an immediate cease-fire in
Lebanon, and a rapid withdrawal of the IDF, with the Lebanese army taking on
responsibility for keeping peace in southern Lebanon.”[75] He advocated a
policy based on reaching an agreement with the Syrians, even if this required
“territorial concessions” on the Golan Heights.
However, Mordechai, like Barak, was careful not to specify the
extent of the withdrawal that he would accept in the Golan Heights.
Former IDF Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, in the second position on
the Center party list, also warned against escalation. “Wiping out a village in
Lebanon will not solve the problem. It could only bring temporary quiet but
will not solve the problem….A unilateral withdrawal…will only bring all of
those elements that want to harm us to the border fence and will endanger IDF
soldiers, and will eventually cost in terms of soldiers and also citizens of
Israel.” At the same time, Shahak noted that a “condition for starting talks
with Syria and Lebanon is a halt to all [Hizbollah] activities in southern
Lebanon.”[76]
Thus, the debate on Lebanon provided a
relatively clear contrast between the differing approaches of the two major
candidates for Prime Minister. Most importantly, this debate showed the
centrality of finding a solution to the Lebanese quagmire as quickly as
possible.
Summary: Continuity Amid Change
In the 1999 Israeli election campaign, foreign and security policy did
not provide the central focus. Netanyahu’s election strategy depended on
turning issues such as Palestinian statehood, Jerusalem, and terrorism into the
main factors, but he failed and other issues dominated and determined the
results. The floating voters that had supported Rabin in 1992 and Netanyahu in
1996 went to Barak in 1999.
Netanyahu also failed in the attempt to rerun the 1996 campaign and to
shift the focus from Barak to Shimon Peres or Yassir Arafat. In part as a
result of the outcome in 1996 and Netanyahu’s victory then, the situation had
changed fundamentally and Netanyahu’s record and policies were subject to
criticism and attack.
Similarly, in terms of foreign and security policy, it would be
inaccurate to view the 1999 election campaign and results as marking a return
to the situation in May 1996, or a major shift from the Netanyahu era. Barak’s
centrist policies, combining security with cautious pursuit of agreements with
the Palestinians and Syria, were more than election tactics. Rather, these
policies reflected strongly held positions, as well as a broad Israeli
consensus that Barak articulated.
As prime minister, Barak’s success in governing and making decisions on
the critical foreign policy and security issues will depend, in large part, on
his ability to maintain this domestic political consensus. The broad government
he formed, initially consisting of 75 members of the Knesset (including many
parties that were members of Netanyahu’s coalition, and well above the
61-member minimum majority), provides a strong base for maintaining consensus,
but also limits the degree of freedom. When difficult decisions are made
regarding settlements, Lebanon, and negotiations with Syria, Barak will face
opposing parties and ideologies within the government. Nevertheless, if he
succeeds, Barak could transform Israeli politics, creating a strong centrist
bloc based on the floating voters of 1992 and 1996.
* Yael Ribner and David Hain provided
research assistance for this chapter.
1. Maariv, results
of a survey carried out by Gallup the week of January 15, 1999, of a
representative sample of 560 Israeli adults. Survey error +/- 4.5 percentage
points.
2. Yediot
Ahronot, results of a survey carried out by Dahaf, the week of May 14,
1999, of a representative sample of 1,100 Israeli adults. Survey error +/- 3
percentage points.
3. Maariv, February, 26, 1999, results
of a survey carried out by Gallup on February 24, 1999, of a representative
sample of 560 Israeli adults. Survey error +/- 4.5 percentage points.
4.
Jon Immanuel, David Makovsky, and Michal Yudelman, “Netanyahu, Arafat Meet at
Erez,” Jerusalem Post, September 5, 1996.
5.
Sarah Honig, David Rudge, and Liat Collins, “Ministers Expect Accord Vote
Today,” Jerusalem Post, January 15, 1997.
6. “Building in
Jerusalem, Background, Har Homa,” February 24, 1997, Israel Line, MFA website,
www.israel.org.il.
9. David Zev Harris, Liat Collins, and Danna Harman, “TV Debate Turns
into Feud,” Jerusalem Post, April 14, 1999; Sarah Honig, “Analysis:
Sticking the Knife In,” Jerusalem Post, April 14, 1999.
17. Ben Lynfield, “Peres Voices Support for
Palestinian State,” Jerusalem Post, January 12, 1999; Danny Rubinstein,
“Peres Urges PA to Negotiate Statehood; Arafat Replies that ‘We Cannot Simply
Ignore’ May 4 Deadline for Declaration,” Haaretz, January 12, 1999.
23. David Makovsky, “Arafat will Delay Independence
— If U.S. Backs the Call;
Announcement would Come at Bethlehem
Festivities for Christmas and Millennium,” Haaretz, January 18, 1999.
27.
David Makovsky, “Invoking Holocaust, PM Heaps Scorn on EU Position on
Palestinian State,” Haaretz, March 26, 1999.
29. David Makovsky, “Israel Fails to Block UN
Vote on Partition, Right of Return,” Haaretz, April 28, 1999.
30.
Nitzan Horowitz and Amira Hass, “If U.S. Says Yes to Statehood, Arafat will
Delay Declaration,” Haaretz, March 22, 1999.
32. Hillel Kuttler and Dana Harman, “Arafat
to Ask U.S. to Support Statehood,” Jerusalem Post, March 22, 1999.
37.
Ben Lynfield and Dana Harman, “PA Backing Down from May 4 Declaration,” Jerusalem
Post, April 28, 1999; Amira Hass, “Statehood Deferred till June, Netanyahu
Declares, ‘We Saved the Peace Process,’”Haaretz, April 30, 1999.
38. Dana Harman and Ben Lynfield, “PM Claims
Credit for No Statehood Declaration,” Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1999.
39. Maariv, results of a survey
carried out by Gallup the week of January 15, 1999, of a representative sample
of 560 Israeli adults. Survey error +/- 4.5 percentage points.
40. Yediot Ahronot, results of a
survey carried out by Dahaf the week of May 14, 1999, of a representative
sample of 1,100 Israeli adults. Survey error +/- 3 percentage points.
41. Dana Harman,
“Sharon Launches Campaign to Counter EU Jerusalem Letter,” Jerusalem Post,
March 14, 1999.
42. Dana Harman, “Sharon: UN Resolutions on
Jerusalem are Null and Void,” Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1999.
43. Hillel
Kuttler and Dana Harman, “Moynihan: Make Temporary US Embassy in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem
Post, March 28, 1999.
44. Ben Lynfield, “Gush Shalom Marches in
Support of Jerusalem as Capital of Palestinian State,” Jerusalem Post,
April 4, 1999.
45. Dan Izenberg, “Palestinian Offices in
Jerusalem to Remain Open Pending Hearing,” Jerusalem Post, April 9,
1999.
46. Dana Harman and Ben Lynfield, “Security
Cabinet to Shut 3 Orient House Offices,” Jerusalem Post, April 23, 1999.
52. See Gerald M. Steinberg, “A Nation that
Dwells Alone? Foreign Policy in the 1992 Elections,” Israel at the Polls
1992, Daniel Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1995).
53. See Gerald M. Steinberg, “Peace, Security and Terror in the 1996
Elections,” in Israel Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1997) (special
issue: Israel at the Polls 1996, Daniel Elazar and Shmuel Sandler,
eds.).
54. Dana Harman, “Ross: US to Play Less Central Role in Final Status
Talks,” Jerusalem Post, January 13, 1999.
58. “Clinton’s Letter to Israeli Defense
Chief Seen as Snub of Netanyahu,” Reuters, January 16, 1999.
59. Dana Harman, “Ross: Settlements ‘Very Destructive,’” Jerusalem
Post, March 14, 1999; Hillel Kuttler, “US: Settlement Expansion Jeopardizes
Peace,” Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1999.
63. Dana Harman, Hillel Kuttler, and news agencies, “US Calls for Peace
Deal within a Year,” Jerusalem Post, April 27, 1999.
64. Hillel Kuttler, “Clinton, Congress Tussle
over US Embassy Move,” Jerusalem Post, May 9, 1999; Dana Harman, Hillel
Kuttler, and news agencies, “US Calls for Peace Deal.”
66. Maariv, results of a survey
carried out by Gallup on February 24, 1999, of a representative sample of 560
Israeli adults. Survey error +/- 4.5 percentage points.
67. The Israeli government claimed that in October 1984, the UN
Secretary General Perez de Cueller sent a letter that linked Resolution 425 to
security arrangements, and even hinted at Syrian acceptance of this link.
Current Secretary General Kofi Anan drafted an agreement for Israeli
withdrawal, including the deployment of the Lebanese Army in areas vacated by
Israel. Thus, the formal Israeli acceptance of UNSCR 425 led to progress in
developing a common focus and outline for an agreement, but it did not lead to
a breakthrough.
68. During the first two years of the
Netanyahu government, Ariel Sharon served as Minister of Infrastructure and
also played a major role in foreign policy and security decisions. His role
increased in the fall of 1998 when he was appointed Foreign Minister.
69. Danna Harman and David Rudge, “Netanyahu
Unlikely to Back Sharon on Lebanon Pullout,” Jerusalem Post, December
27, 1999.
72. Maariv, results of a survey
carried out by Gallup on February 24, 1999, of a representative sample of 560
Israeli adults. Survey error +/- 4.5 percentage points.