In seven months from now, the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations enter the third and last phase. According to the original Oslo (the 1993 Declaration of Principles), negotiations on the Status will begin on May 4 1996. At that time, all those issues that have been deferred during the first two stages this process will be placed squarely in the center of the table. May 4, Yassir Arafat can be expected to present his proposal, a Palestinian State from the Jordan Valley to the outskirts Tel Aviv, the removal of all Israeli settlements, Palestinian to a "right of return", control over the main water aquifers,at least shared sovereignty in Jerusalem.

These issues have all been avoided during the interim talks they are the most difficult and intractable, and would have to the breakdown in the negotiations. The theory behind theOslo process was that the successful implementation of the two stages would give Israel and the Palestinians confidence and interests in its continuation. At that point, the leadership both sides would have been able to make the difficult concessionsin order to prevent the collapse of the talks. This utopian was reflected in the Israeli Foreign Ministry's press releases, speak of "a new era of cooperation and co-existence based oninterest, dignity, and mutual respect."

However, this scenario was always a long-shot, and not much hassince the first White House signing ceremony of September 13to change the odds. On the contrary, although the time-line was designed to provide almost two years between theof the second stage of the process and the opening oflast phase of negotiations, in reality, only a few weeks, at most,separate these stages.

Continued suicide bombings, and the general Palestinian failure fulfill the obligations under the Gaza-Jericho agreements, have much of the support for the negotiations in Israel. The has been able to maintain a very thin majority for theconcluded Taba agreement, but there is insufficient public or support to go any further until the Palestinians have in kind. In addition, the failure to cooperate with the police in capturing or extraditing terrorists, Arafat's calls for Jihad, the PLO's failure to change its charter for the destruction of Israel, and the continued hatred for Jews and Israel in PLO videos, speeches and propaganda,undermined the initial Israeli enthusiasm for this process.

So the most likely scenario for the next year is an impasse, by a breakdown of formal negotiations, and then de-facto between Palestinians and Israelis. The chances of any on permanent status are very small, but the process of has begun and will continue on a unilateral basis, asby Israeli domestic politics and security requirements. A victory in the 1996 elections will accelerate the unilateral, while a Labor victory will add a few more months or years of until the impasse is reached. However, short of aand unprecedented change in the Palestinian leadership, and aimplementation of all the requirements of the Taba agreement, asas a serious clampdown on terrorist support network, even a Labor will find it impossible to go much further with the.

Five years from now, we are likely to look back at the Taba and the Washington signing ceremony as the high-water mark the negotiating process. The first stage of the agreement willbe implemented, with the IDF withdrawing from the seven majorcities (including most of Hebron), and shared patrols invillages and surrounding areas (Area B on the maps). The security for Israel are substantial, but they can be managed andby limiting access into Israel for Palestinians (closures).

However, without a fundamental change among the Palestinians, the status will be determined unilaterally and the boundariesare created through the implementation of the first stage of the agreement will become the new Israeli borders. Israel will no be responsible for the vast majority of Palestinians, the IDF not have to patrol these cities, and full-fledged borders,, and patrol roads will reduce terrorism. At the same time, thewill have their own government, or even mini-state, and a degree of control over their lives. This is not the "New Middle" of Shimon Peres' dreams, but for everyone, it is better than thebefore the process began in 1991.